Date: Thu, 02 Mar 2017 09:13:26 -0800
From: martinduke <notifications@github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/353/283716658@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/353@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/353@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Replace CONNECTION_CLOSE with Public Reset
 (#353)
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> we should be removing PUBLIC_RESET uses cases wherever possible because they have poor security properties.

I don't see what this achieves. We are not going to eliminate PUBLIC_RESET, so it will always be available for attackers who want to break connections. The protocol is only as strong as the PUBLIC_RESET authentication, so imposing additional security on a subset of termination messages achieves nothing.

This wouldn't be true if we declared different behavior on receipt of PUBLIC_RESET: for instance, the receiver could keep state for some amount of time, in case legitimate packets arrived after a spoofed reset. But in the absence of such a mechanism, CONNECTION_CLOSE achieves nothing.

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<blockquote>
<p>we should be removing PUBLIC_RESET uses cases wherever possible becaus=
e they have poor security properties.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I don't see what this achieves. We are not going to eliminate PUBLIC_R=
ESET, so it will always be available for attackers who want to break conn=
ections. The protocol is only as strong as the PUBLIC_RESET authenticatio=
n, so imposing additional security on a subset of termination messages ac=
hieves nothing.</p>
<p>This wouldn't be true if we declared different behavior on receipt of =
PUBLIC_RESET: for instance, the receiver could keep state for some amount=
 of time, in case legitimate packets arrived after a spoofed reset. But i=
n the absence of such a mechanism, CONNECTION_CLOSE achieves nothing.</p>=


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 #353: \u003e we should be removing PUBLIC_RESET uses cases wherever poss=
ible because they have poor security properties.\r\n\r\nI don't see what =
this achieves. We are not going to eliminate PUBLIC_RESET, so it will alw=
ays be available for attackers who want to break connections. The protoco=
l is only as strong as the PUBLIC_RESET authentication, so imposing addit=
ional security on a subset of termination messages achieves nothing.\r\n\=
r\nThis wouldn't be true if we declared different behavior on receipt of =
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 of time, in case legitimate packets arrived after a spoofed reset. But i=
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