Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Amplification attack using retry tokens and spoofed addresses (#2064)

Christian Huitema <> Fri, 30 November 2018 03:58 UTC

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From: Christian Huitema <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Amplification attack using retry tokens and spoofed addresses (#2064)
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Yes, the RETRY tokens are easier to steal than the NEW TOKEN. Making sure that we protect at least that would be nice.

I am thinking at how attackers could get a NEW TOKEN valid for the target IP. You probably need to run at least one connection from the target to the amplification server. That's relatively easy if you want to demolish a public network -- connect once as a guest, get tokens from a bunch of servers, use them to flood the network access point. So yes, there is still a risk.

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