Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Client's initial destination CID is unauthenticated (#1486)

[ekr <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 1:13 PM, MikkelFJ <[e-mail]> wrote:

> If the server sent something back encrypted with the initial server secret
> and verified by the client, then that would also work. But the QUIC TLS doc
> is hard to read. It is not very clear what kind of key is used in the
> servers initial response - is that already 1-RTT,
>
It clearly can't be the 1-RTT key because it contains the DH share that le
used to generate the 1-RTT key. But after that in the same flight there is
data that is in epoch 2.

This should be fairly clear in:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-13#section-6.5

or is there a first flight with initial keys. If it is the initial key,
> then the client can only verify the tag if the ODCID matches. If it is
> hashed into the 1-RTT context, it doesn't matter.
>
> this makes little sense to me: what key is used after GetHandshake server
> side?
> https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-tls.html#rfc.section.4.1.3
>

Initial keys.


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