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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] amplification attack using Retry and VN triggered by coalesced Initial packets (#2259)

Marten Seemann <notifications@github.com> Mon, 31 December 2018 03:34 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] amplification attack using Retry and VN triggered by coalesced Initial packets (#2259)
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@martinthomson Why do we need to allow multiple packets of the same encryption level in one UDP datagram? I can't see a single use case for this, but I see a lot of ways this can be used in malicious ways.
We introduced coalesced packets to reduce HoL blocking on encryption level changes, not to give senders the ability to stuff 67 packets into a single datagram.

Proposed text:
> A sender MUST NOT coalesce multiple packets with the same encryption level into a single datagram. Receiver SHOULD ignore any subsequent packets that have the same encryption level as any of the previous packets in the datagram.

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