Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow most frames in 0-RTT (#2355)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Sat, 09 March 2019 00:33 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow most frames in 0-RTT (#2355)
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MikeBishop approved this pull request.



> +
+: TLS session tickets and address validation tokens are used to carry QUIC
+  configuration information between connections.  These MUST NOT be used to
+  carry application state.  The potential for reuse of these tokens means that
+  they require stronger protections against replay.
+
+A server that accepts 0-RTT on a connection incurs a higher cost than accepting
+a connection without 0-RTT.  This includes higher processing and computation
+costs.  Servers need to consider the probability of replay and all associated
+costs when accepting 0-RTT.
+
+Ultimately, the responsibility for managing the risks of replay attacks with
+0-RTT lies with an application protocol.  An application protocol that uses QUIC
+MUST describe how the protocol uses 0-RTT and the measures that are employed to
+protect against replay attack.  An analysis of replay risk needs to consider
+all QUIC protocol features carry application semantics.

```suggestion
all QUIC protocol features which carry application semantics.
```

> @@ -1281,6 +1280,50 @@ Never assume that because it isn't in the security considerations section it
 doesn't affect security.  Most of this document does.
 
 
+## Replay Attacks with 0-RTT
+
+As described in Section 8 of {{!TLS13}}, use of TLS early data comes with an
+exposure to replay attack.  The use of 0-RTT in QUIC is similarly vulnerable to
+replay attack.
+
+Endpoints MUST implement and use the replay protections described in {{!TLS13}},
+however it is recognized that these protections are imperfect.  Therefore,
+additional consideration of the risk of replay are needed.

```suggestion
additional consideration of the risk of replay is needed.
```
(or "considerations ... are")

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