Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] No spoofed ACK attack (#2188)

[Marten Seemann <[e-mail]>]

marten-seemann approved this pull request.



> -sent, the connection can be aborted.
-
-The second mitigation is that the server can require that acknowledgments for
-sent packets match the encryption level of the sent packet.  This mitigation is
-useful if the connection has an ephemeral forward-secure key that is generated
-and used for every new connection.  If a packet sent is protected with a
-forward-secure key, then any acknowledgments that are received for them MUST
-also be forward-secure protected.  Since the attacker will not have the
-forward-secure key, the attacker will not be able to generate forward-secure
-protected packets with ACK frames.
-
+({{address-validation}}) from a server and then release the IP address it used
+to acquire that token.  At a later time, the attacker may initiate a 0-RTT
+connection with a server by spoofing this same address, which might now address
+a different (victim) endpoint.  The attacker can thus potentially cause the
+server to send an initial window's worth of data towards the victim.

s/initial window's/initial congestion window/

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