Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] ECN verification text (#2752)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Thu, 08 August 2019 01:55 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] ECN verification text (#2752)
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martinthomson approved this pull request.

Minor nits only.  Thanks for getting the largest acknowledged thing.

> -reduced throughput or other undesirable side-effects.  To reduce this risk, an
-endpoint uses the following steps to verify the counts it receives in an ACK
-frame.
+To start ECN validation, an endpoint SHOULD do the following when sending
+packets on a new path to a peer:
+
+* Set the ECT(0) codepoint in the IP header of early outgoing packets sent on a
+  new path to the peer {{!RFC8311}}.
+
+* If all packets that were sent with the ECT(0) codepoint are eventually deemed
+  lost {{QUIC-RECOVERY}}, validation is deemed to have failed.
+
+To reduce the chances of misinterpreting congestive loss as packets dropped by a
+faulty network element, an endpoint could set the ECT(0) codepoint in the first
+ten outgoing packets on a path, or for a period of three RTTs, whichever occurs
+first.  Implementations MAY experiment with and use other strategies.  An

I would make a new paragraph here that says this:

Implementations MAY experiment with and use other strategies for use of ECN.  Other methods of probing paths for ECN support are possible, as are different marking strategies, including those that use ECT(1).

>  
 * Any increase in either ECT(0) or ECT(1) counts, plus any increase in the CE
   count, MUST be no smaller than the number of packets sent with the
   corresponding ECT codepoint that are newly acknowledged in this ACK frame.
   This step detects any erroneous network remarking from ECT(0) to ECT(1) (or
   vice versa).
 
+Processing ECN counts out of order can result in validation failure.  An
+endpoint SHOULD NOT perform this validation if this ACK frame does not advance
+the largest packet number acknowledged in this connection.

Your framing makes me ask a question: Is this test connection-scoped, or just path-scoped?  I think that either works about as well as any other, but the path-scoped one might be more correct.

But then path-scoped is probably tricky to implement.  So let's not worry about that.

> -setting ECT codepoints in subsequent packets.  Doing so allows the connection to
-be resilient to network elements that corrupt ECN codepoints in the IP header or
-drop packets with ECT or CE codepoints in the IP header.
+#### Validation Outcomes
+
+If validation fails, then the endpoint stops sending ECN markings in subsequent
+IP packets with the expectation that either the network path or the peer does
+not support ECN.
+
+Upon successful validation, an endpoint can continue to set ECT codepoints in
+subsequent packets with the expectation that the path is ECN-capable.  Network
+routing and path elements can change mid-connection however; an endpoint MUST
+disable ECN if validation fails at any point in the connection.
+
+Even if validation fails, an endpoint MAY re-validate ECN on the same path to
+the peer at any later time in the connection.

Drop "to the peer".

I'm not happy about the hyphenated "re-validate", but I'm short on rephrasing suggestions, sorry.

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