Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Bound 0-to-1-RTT Transition (#2466)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Fri, 15 February 2019 01:10 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Bound 0-to-1-RTT Transition (#2466)
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What @martinthomson says.

I think we can consider rephrasing the following sentence in #2461 to also suggest the possibility of using PN to detect misuse of 0-RTT packets.

> A server MAY treat a violation of remembered limits as a connection error of an appropriate type (for instance, a FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR for exceeding stream data limits)."

But other than that, #2461 is better.

Note also that the detecting 0-RTT misuse based on PN is weaker than the one based on frame-types. This is because when the PN-based defense cannot detect an attack that replays an 0-RTT connection _that the attacker has created_. In such an attack, an attacker can send a 1-RTT packet using a large PN, then after that send 0-RTT packets with smaller packet numbers.

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