Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Let server abort on post-Retry packet number reset (#3990)

Marten Seemann <notifications@github.com> Wed, 02 September 2020 02:54 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2020 19:54:04 -0700
From: Marten Seemann <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Let server abort on post-Retry packet number reset (#3990)
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@marten-seemann commented on this pull request.



> @@ -4807,6 +4807,8 @@ responding to a Retry packet. However, the data sent in these packets could be
 different than what was sent earlier. Sending these new packets with the same
 packet number is likely to compromise the packet protection for those packets
 because the same key and nonce could be used to protect different content.
+A server MAY abort the connection if it detects that the client reset the

> My argument for why here is because this PN reuse can be a security issue.

I disagree with this statement. There's only a security issue if the client resets the 0-RTT packet number space, but the server wouldn't be able to detect that, since it wouldn't even bother to unprotect 0-RTT packets. So the only violation that can be detected here is the reuse of packet numbers in the Initial packet number space. Since the Initial keys are publicly known anyway, this can't be a security issue.

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