Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

[Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>]

MikeBishop commented on this pull request.



> @@ -3592,6 +3594,21 @@ and will contain a CRYPTO frame with an offset matching the size of the CRYPTO
 frame sent in the first Initial packet.  Cryptographic handshake messages
 subsequent to the first do not need to fit within a single UDP datagram.
 
+
+### Abandoning Initial Packets {#discard-initial}
+
+A client stops both sending and accepting Initial packets when it sends its
+first Handshake packet.  A server stops sending and accepting Initial packets
+when it receives its first Handshake packet.  Though packets might still be in
+flight or awaiting acknowledgment, no further Initial packets need to be
+exchanged beyond this point.  Initial packet protection keys are discarded (see
+Section 4.10 of {{QUIC-TLS}}) along with any loss recovery and congestion
+control state (see Sections 5.3.1.2 and 6.9 of {{QUIC-RECOVERY}}).

Not my area, but I'm not sure implies the right thing to say that any congestion control state gets discarded here.  The congestion controller doesn't care what encryption level things are at, it just cares about bytes.

Perhaps it would be worth being more concrete:  "discarded(...), and all Initial packets are considered acknowledged for loss recovery and congestion control purposes (see...)."  This would also make the following paragraph unnecessary.

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