Return-Path: X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3D6512DDA3 for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 02:06:53 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -8.47 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.47 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.47, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ch--2tqjkGGr for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 02:06:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from out-6.smtp.github.com (out-6.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.197]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40E741277BB for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 02:06:52 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 02:06:51 -0800 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1542017211; bh=/cd3lTrgCj5NhZdJTZTBqIEj49ppyyXBiPZh8w+LDuc=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=C4DKFQfZPk2qK9BizvoswSw20bFAxpKRzGRVoBhSgjxpGCw40mKwpe3QcOU3DZ2vB qLEywsxEbLROBvoS1rWCj+v+SGWVS78aSsG3gx11CsMlFNkmThsXrksFlN185JrFTt K2aCfr+u8Lm2gceLb38OWUPYdpczJ7CgxAgIiedw= From: Martin Thomson Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts To: quicwg/base-drafts Cc: Subscribed Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Introduce a bit to indicate the server doesn't do IP-based authentication (#1993) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5be950bb55564_2a093fb3334d45c42942ab"; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: list X-GitHub-Sender: martinthomson X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org Archived-At: X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 10:06:54 -0000 ----==_mimepart_5be950bb55564_2a093fb3334d45c42942ab Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Since this idea probably traces back to me, I can't really say this is bad. But I think that we can probably do something in an extension. This is a somewhat specialized use case. Happy to work with you, @annevk or @jakearchibald, to make that happen. A generic TLS extension might be better here. QUIC could pick that up, but it might also be nice to have that signal in other contexts than just QUIC. I have significant reservations about how this sort of extension might be deployed safely. We'll have to be very careful to explain the risks of a mistake. Turning on a server-level config like this requires confidence that there are no resources on that server that are restricted. Worse, if servers can be used for connection coalescing (in HTTP/2 or QUIC), then that risk extends to all resources across all origins that might be coalesced onto the same connection. I suspect that server-level CORS is a common-enough implementation technique. So we likely already have servers taking that risk. So on balance this is probably worth doing. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/1993#issuecomment-437824022 ----==_mimepart_5be950bb55564_2a093fb3334d45c42942ab Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Since this idea probably traces back to me, I can't really say this is= bad. But I think that we can probably do something in an extension. Th= is is a somewhat specialized use case. Happy to work with you, @annev= k or @jakearchibald, to make that happen.

A generic TLS extension might be better here. QUIC could pick that up= , but it might also be nice to have that signal in other contexts than ju= st QUIC.

I have significant reservations about how this sort of extension might= be deployed safely. We'll have to be very careful to explain the risks = of a mistake. Turning on a server-level config like this requires confid= ence that there are no resources on that server that are restricted. Wor= se, if servers can be used for connection coalescing (in HTTP/2 or QUIC),= then that risk extends to all resources across all origins that might be= coalesced onto the same connection.

I suspect that server-level CORS is a common-enough implementation tec= hnique. So we likely already have servers taking that risk. So on balan= ce this is probably worth doing.

&m= dash;
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thre= ad.
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub,= or mute the thread.3D""

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