Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

[janaiyengar <[e-mail]>]

janaiyengar commented on this pull request.



> @@ -3592,6 +3594,21 @@ and will contain a CRYPTO frame with an offset matching the size of the CRYPTO
 frame sent in the first Initial packet.  Cryptographic handshake messages
 subsequent to the first do not need to fit within a single UDP datagram.
 
+
+### Abandoning Initial Packets {#discard-initial}
+
+A client stops both sending and accepting Initial packets when it sends its
+first Handshake packet.  A server stops sending and accepting Initial packets
+when it receives its first Handshake packet.  Though packets might still be in
+flight or awaiting acknowledgment, no further Initial packets need to be
+exchanged beyond this point.  Initial packet protection keys are discarded (see
+Section 4.10 of {{QUIC-TLS}}) along with any loss recovery and congestion
+control state (see Sections 5.3.1.2 and 6.9 of {{QUIC-RECOVERY}}).

Good points. I'd say the conservative approach is the one @martinthomson suggests. I wonder if it might be better to be more explicit about it though, but I'll save that for another PR I think.

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