Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Immediately close with INVALID_TOKEN (#3107)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Tue, 05 November 2019 01:29 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Immediately close with INVALID_TOKEN (#3107)
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janaiyengar commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1641,12 +1641,14 @@ of connection establishment.  By giving the client a different connection ID to
 use, a server can cause the connection to be routed to a server instance with
 more resources available for new connections.
 
-If a server receives a client Initial with an invalid Retry token,
-it knows the client will not accept another Retry token.  It can either
-proceed with the handshake without verifying the token or immediately close
-({{immediate-close}}) the connection with an connection error of
-INVALID_TOKEN to cause the handshake to fail quickly instead of waiting
-for the client to timeout.
+If a server receives a client Initial that can be unprotected but contains an
+invalid Retry token, it knows the client will not accept another Retry token.
+The server can drop such a packet and allow the client to time out to detect
+handshake failure, but that is a significant latency penalty to the client.

I definitely like this text better. That said, I'm not sure that we should recommend sending a connection close. Esp. when under DoS, we do not want servers doing more work than necessary. 

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