Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

Christian Huitema <> Wed, 12 December 2018 23:09 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 23:09:07 +0000
From: Christian Huitema <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)
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I am looking at the arguments on this thread, and I think EKR and Kazuho are making very similar points:

1) The current state is that packet injection attacks are possible until 3 RTT after handshake is complete, or about 4 RTT from the time the Client Hello is sent.

2) This PR (#2045) would reduce the window from 4 RTT to 1 RTT.

3) But it is reasonably easy for attackers to inject packets within 0.5 RTT from the point the Client Hello is sent.

4) Thus we get a piecemeal defense that adds some complexity and risk but does not actually solve the problem.

I feel sad.

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