Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-quic-tls-33: (with COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-quic-tls-33: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thank you to Radia Perlman for the SECDIR review and the ensuing discussion
about this review.

Two areas of recommended clarity:

** Section 4.  Recommend a bit more text up front describing the notion of
“encryption levels”.  This section first introduces the concept by noting that
“Those frames are packaged into QUIC packets and encrypted under the current
TLS encryption level”.  Later in Section 4.1.3, it is noted that “Four
encryption levels are used, producing keys for Initial, 0-RTT, Handshake, and
1-RTT packets” which makes these “levels” seem only like categories.  In
describing specific processing there is text such as “When TLS provides keys
for a higher encryption level …” which now describes a relatively ordering
perhaps with something have having or less.  I might be helpful to include an
early narrative on what “higher” and “lower” and encryption “levels” means and
how level changes occur (i.e., explicitly linking them to changes in the QUIC
state machine).

** Section 4.4.  Per the peer authentication text, should it be acknowledged
that due the general-purpose nature of the protocol, peer validation practices
may will need to be further defined by applications?