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Re: A question about user tracking with QUIC

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Mon, 07 June 2021 12:58 UTC

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Date: Mon, 07 Jun 2021 14:55:54 +0200
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Robin MARX <robin.marx@uhasselt.be>
Cc: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: A question about user tracking with QUIC
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On Mon, Jun 07, 2021 at 02:46:32PM +0200,
 Robin MARX <robin.marx@uhasselt.be> wrote 
 a message of 127 lines which said:

> Could you give more (technical) details why you feel long-lived QUIC
> connections can allow user tracking, and specifically in the IP-switching
> case?
> 
> For an on-path attacker observing encrypted QUIC

Indeed, I forgot an important thing: tracking BY THE SERVER
(obviously, QUIC protects against an observer).

> For an attacker with access to the decrypted payloads, I'm not sure how
> QUIC differs from TCP or H3 differs from H2 in your view?

TCP and H2 do not survive IP address change. And I suspect that
long-term connections might be more common with QUIC.

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