Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 23 May 2018 21:34 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 14:33:31 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBNNYNhKEBiB3_cVGRMO7_cV_c8vzjuHgUpp59ziTJWeHg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal
To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Swett <ianswett=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@mozilla.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 2:00 PM, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 1:23 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Howdy, >>> >>> Thanks for sharing the document. I have a couple of detailed comments, >>> and then some high level comments which I will put into a separate email. >>> >>> First, the document says this: >>> >>> Though proper analysis is needed, it is not likely that the removal of >>> the TLS record layer will cause a security concern, because the security >>> properties provided by QUIC packets are identical to what have been >>> provided by TLS records. >>> >>> >>> I'm not sure that this is actually the statement we need to analyze, >>> though. We need to be sure that the security properties of TLS records used >>> in TCP packets are available in QUIC streams in QUIC packets using UDP as a >>> multiplexing layer. There appear to be some difference in where the >>> facilities the overall system provides that may require more description. >>> As an example, I think the way padding works in this proposal needs more >>> description. If I understand correctly, each TLS record is encrypted >>> separately and the presence or absence of padding is indicated by a >>> padding_length byte present in each record. That means the padding is >>> related to the record, not the packet; by removing the record layer and >>> using QUIC frames, though, we seem to have a different padding structure. >>> QUIC uses padding frames, not padding within other frame types which is >>> both conceptually and practically different. >>> >> >> I believe you have misunderstood. In this document, there are no TLS >> records and TLS handshake messages are carried in CRYPTO_HS frames. >> Accordingly, padding is provided in the same fashion as QUIC ordinarily >> does, i.e., using PADDING frames. >> >> That's what I understood from the design document. The point I'm making > is that this actually a substantive change to the padding structure that > was previously present (in TLS records), and the security analysis has to > take that into account, so it (and similar things) should be described. > I don't think most of the analyses take padding into account, partly because basically nobody pads, so nobody was assuming that padding came from TLS. -Ekr Similarly, I'd be interested in more text on the interaction with >> precedence, since the loss of the record layer means that the former >> guarantee that the record layer makes records available in the order in >> which they were protected now seems to be unavailable. >> > > I'm not quite sure I follow what you are asking about here. In both cases, > TLS sits on top of QUIC's reliable in-order deliver guarantees. Is the > point you are making that formerly, if QUIC violated these guarantees, that > would result in TLS handshake failure, whereas now it does not? > > This just related to the general point I was making above. When the > design shifts where it was getting a function, it would be helpful if it > called it out more directly, to facilitate the analysis. > > regards, > > Ted > > -Ekr >> >> >> >>> regards, >>> >>> >>> Ted >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 6:30 PM, Ian Swett < >>> ianswett=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *Dear QUIC WG,On behalf of the Stream 0 Design Team, I am pleased to >>>> report that we have consensus on a proposed approach to share with the WG. >>>> The DT's proposal will make QUIC and TLS work closer together and >>>> incorporates ideas from DTLS, but it does not use the DTLS protocol itself. >>>> The DT believes this solves the important open Stream 0 issues. The >>>> proposal will be a bit more invasive in TLS, but we believe it is the right >>>> long-term direction and several TLS stacks (BoringSSL, PicoTLS, NSS, and >>>> Mint) are willing and able to do the work necessary.. A number of stacks >>>> are currently working on implementations of this new approach, which we >>>> hope to have in time for the Interim meeting.A design document describing >>>> the overall approach can be found >>>> at:https://docs.google..com/document/d/1fRsJqPinJl8N3b-bflDRV6auojfJLkxddT93j6SwHY8/edit >>>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fRsJqPinJl8N3b-bflDRV6auojfJLkxddT93j6SwHY8/edit>A >>>> PR making the changes to the QUIC documents can be found >>>> at:https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/1377 >>>> <https://github.com/ekr/base-drafts/pull/29>A few design details did not >>>> have clear consensus, but it was felt it would be better to discuss those >>>> in the wider WG than delay the design team. A consistent choice was made >>>> in the PR and these issues are mentioned in Appendix B of the design doc.As >>>> always, comments and questions welcome. That said, this is a big PR and we >>>> recognize that some editorial work is going to be needed before merging. In >>>> the interest of letting people follow along, and to keep github from >>>> falling over, we ask people to keep discussion on the mailing list and >>>> refrain from making PR comments.See you in Kista!* >>>> Ian and Eric >>>> >>> >>> >> >
- Stream0 Design Team Proposal Ian Swett
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Martin Thomson
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Kazuho Oku
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Kazuho Oku
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Christian Huitema
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Jana Iyengar
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Kazuho Oku
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Kazuho Oku
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Kazuho Oku
- RE: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Lucas Pardue
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Jana Iyengar
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Ted Hardie
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Eric Rescorla
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Ted Hardie
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Eric Rescorla
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Jana Iyengar
- RE: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Mike Bishop
- RE: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Mike Bishop
- RE: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Mike Bishop
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Kazuho Oku
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Jana Iyengar
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Eric Rescorla
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Martin Thomson
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Eric Rescorla
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Jana Iyengar
- Re: Stream0 Design Team Proposal Eric Rescorla