Re: New Version Notification for draft-dawkins-quic-what-to-do-with-multipath-03.txt

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Fri, 08 January 2021 07:46 UTC

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Subject: Re: New Version Notification for draft-dawkins-quic-what-to-do-with-multipath-03.txt
To: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
Cc: Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
References: <160998952719.13932.9365244706084056888@ietfa.amsl.com> <CAKKJt-fP8AKK4FmL7jj84OoRYhaJfcQtmsGinKSEkX68ki4bfQ@mail.gmail.com> <E34000E5-CA6A-446F-863B-E065F51F9A96@gmail.com>
From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Date: Thu, 07 Jan 2021 23:46:09 -0800
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Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen wrote on 2021-01-07 09:17:
> ...
> 
> From a quick read, I believe you have captured many relevant use cases
> but perhaps the document does not capture the concerns related til NAT
> translation and firewalls.
> 
> ...

i'm not sure enterprise concerns such as NAT or firewalls are important
to this audience. QUIC is policy-immune by design, and those of us who
operate secure private networks (schools, enterprise, military, police,
and many homes) are expecting to simply deny UDP and force the use of an
outbound proxy.

i'd love to be wrong, but section 3 of
https://quicwg.org/ops-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-manageability.html seems
clear as to the intended entropy level and that this level really is
intentional. unfortunately for me as a security private network
operator, my needs in this regard are the same as russia's.

see also:

https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/russia-internet-encryption-protocol-ban.html

vixie

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