Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (was Re: Packet number encryption)
Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Wed, 07 February 2018 10:10 UTC
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2018 21:10:20 +1100
Message-ID: <CABkgnnXkEsQkmdgX6c4_9w6YhTaPYrtdhUEJ8imi7NSChyC32g@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (was Re: Packet number encryption)
To: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
Cc: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>, "Brian Trammell (IETF)" <ietf@trammell.ch>, QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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I looked into these when I first considered packet number encryption. They are not typically bijective on 2^N-1. That's not a great outcome here. Also, random access is a requirement and that isn't straightforward here, even with the good ones. Also reversing is possible, but more complicated. On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 8:10 PM, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> wrote: > Instead of a static Pi table, an xorshift+ PRNG could be used. It would > likely be preferable to shorten the cycle such that observers can use hash > lookups and hamming distance computations against selected segments of the > sequence. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xorshift#xorshift+ > > http://xoroshiro.di.unimi.it/xorshift128plus.c > > uint64_t s[2]; > > uint64_t next(void) { > uint64_t s1 = s[0]; > const uint64_t s0 = s[1]; > const uint64_t result = s0 + s1; > s[0] = s0; > s1 ^= s1 << 23; // a > s[1] = s1 ^ s0 ^ (s1 >> 18) ^ (s0 >> 5); // b, c > return result; > } > > > A simpler 32-bit version could also be used since we do not care about long > cycles. > > http://excamera.com/sphinx/article-xorshift.html > > uint32_t seed = 7; // 100% random seed value > > static uint32_t random() > { > seed ^= seed << 13; > seed ^= seed >> 17; > seed ^= seed << 5; > return seed; > } > > > The output would be the bits shifted out of the 32-bit our 64-bit word in > either MSB or LSB first. I’d prefer LSB because it is slightly simpler to > test the LSB bit and divide by 2. > > On 7 February 2018 at 01.29.18, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com) > wrote: > > Also note that this approach is insensitive to skipped packet numbers in > optimistic ACK attack defence. It leaks zero information when the network is > perfect and if the CID hash is random. > > ________________________________ > From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> > Sent: Wednesday, February 7, 2018 12:58:33 AM > To: Kazuho Oku > Cc: Brian Trammell (IETF); QUIC WG > Subject: Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (was Re: Packet > number encryption) > > I actually think a static 1KB table of Pi could work quite well. > > A subset of samples could be indexed in a hashtable and yield loss data > early with some probability. Some samples would miss due to reordering or > loss. If more exact analysis is wanted the levenshtein distance of a sample > sequence against Pi from a synced offset would tell a lot about the data. Or > DNA sequencing. This could be hardware optimized. > > Yet, transmission is always just the next bit in the Pi table. > > Since Pi is effectively random it will ebentually detect mutations if the > observed sequence is long enough. > > Wrt privacy, the CID may be used as a start offset hash into the Pi table. > > There isn’t any need to cover a full RTT worth of Pi bits unless it is used > for latency detection, but in that case the spin could be a pattern like > 10101010 and 00001111 injected into the Pi sequence. A separate spin bit > would be simpler. > > > ________________________________ > From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> > Sent: Tuesday, February 6, 2018 5:22:35 PM > To: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen > Cc: Brian Trammell (IETF); QUIC WG > Subject: Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (was Re: Packet > number encryption) > > 2018-02-06 23:54 GMT+09:00 Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>: >> This idea can be taken further: You can modulate the signal so you use >> multiple packets to encode a zero or a one for half the wave duration. For >> example 1 could be encoded as 0101 over four packets and zero could be >> encoded as 0011 over four packets. >> If there is any reordering, it would show up as an unexpected value in the >> pulse. > > That's definitely an option. > > Actually, I considered using sin wave (that distributes the error > among 1-bit samples) as an example instead of the square wave. > > The primary reason behind my preference to using a square wave is that > it is easier to implement; in fact, emitting a square wave with the > length of 512 packets is as easy as just taking the 9th bit (counting > from LSB) of the packet number (if we forget about the gaps for a > moment). > > > -- > Kazuho Oku
- Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eggert, Lars
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Duke
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- Re: Re: Packet number encryption alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Packet number encryption Patrick McManus
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Willy Tarreau
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Reducing ossification through protocol design (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Salz, Rich
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Martin Thomson
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption David Benjamin
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Eggert, Lars
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen