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Re: Malicious Version Negotiation Handling (Was: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 19 February 2018 04:55 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2018 20:54:18 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBN1hYug-0_VEVyGPRgG0=zHzJazcSo9=WdR09yk9WDO4Q@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Malicious Version Negotiation Handling (Was: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption)
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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On Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 8:49 PM, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
wrote:

> On 2/18/2018 8:41 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> > I don't think increasing the on-path attacker's marginal difficulty
> > from not requiring any crypto to requiring simple crypto in order to
> > mount a DoS attack is worth changing the protocol for.
>
> Changing the protocol, probably not. But Lingmo's suggestion is one of
> the several steps that we could take against hardening against a man on
> the side attack. And it is a very simple one: if you receive a VN that
> does not contain any acceptable option, just ignore it. If this was
> legit, the connection will actually break after a short timer. If it was
> not, the next received message will be a Server Hello, and the
> connection will progress. Sounds like a reasonable trade-off.
>

I think it's fine if people do this. I don't think it's worth requiring in
the spec given the existence of other trivial man-on-the-side attacks.

-Ekr


> -- Christian Huitema
>
>
>

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