Re: Packet number encryption

[Gorry Fairhurst <[e-mail]>]

+1 - Simply: This *is* complicated and seems to add little.

Gorry

On 31/01/2018, 07:44, Mirja Kühlewind wrote:
>
>> Am 31.01.2018 um 04:08 schrieb Martin Thomson<[e-mail]>:
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 8:00 AM, Christian Huitema<[e-mail]>  wrote:
>>>> (1) An unprivileged on-path device that sees a packet from a flow that is
>>>> migrated on purpose by an endpoint (i.e., due to connection migration or
>>>> multipath) should not be able to associate that packet to the prior flow.
>>> Yes.
>> Agreed.  This remains the primary target.  I don't think that there
>> are any negatives with this design with respect to this use case (or
>> at least I found nothing in Brian's email on this point).
> If that is the goal, I think the complexity of the proposed solution is not justified. Just select a new random offset when you migrate but increase the packet number monotonously otherwise to support manageability.
>
> I’m really concerned about complexity here. Even though this scheme is not very complex, any complexity is a potential source for future implementation errors which can also led to restrictions in what changes can be deploy with future versions. Making a protocol as simple as possible and thereby the spec as easy understandable as possible is also key for deployment. If we add complexity here without making it clear what the goal or additional benefit is of the complexity, I think that is just wrong.
>
> My 2c.
> Mirja