Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption)

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Fri, 06 April 2018 10:40 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 06 Apr 2018 20:40:06 +1000
Message-ID: <CABkgnnWdAbQ-M2uNTWb8BkNJYTae8e_XVEgmO5MR_1woPnTd4A@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption)
To: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Cc: "Brian Trammell (IETF)" <ietf@trammell.ch>, Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Frederick Kautz <fkautz@alumni.cmu.edu>
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On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 7:14 PM, Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> wrote:
> One way to minimize the impact could be to suggest certain amount of
> connections (e.g., 5%) to gratuitously migrate to a new tuple just once,
> right after the connection is being established.

I like this idea.  Do it rarely, but with a high enough probability
that it is noticed.

I don't think that we need to specify it, rather permit it (maybe with
observations about the costs of doing it too often), then establish a
convention.  We can reach enough of the client population in this
group that we can probably coordinate effectively such that we reach a
common enough proportion.  Add migrate-after-idle as the current PR
suggests, which has a much lower chance of expanding state and I'm not
seeing much need for "grips".

> If we specify that way, we can assume that the impact on the NAT will be
> having 5% more flows.

5% more only during the first timeout interval (whatever that is) and
thereafter no more with this design.