Update on Version Aliasing, ECHO for QUIC

Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> Wed, 05 May 2021 15:00 UTC

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From: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 08:00:06 -0700
Message-ID: <CAM4esxS5uGATmvAnDQ1VLeKgMkHStWQujUjROj7umLgjME0oeg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Update on Version Aliasing, ECHO for QUIC
To: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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You may recall that at IETF 109 I presented my version aliasing draft. (The
server sends a transport parameter with a random version number and salt
that the client can use next time, which greases the version and [I claim]
secures Initial Packets). It was well received, but I haven't gotten much
in the way of reviews (especially a much-needed security review) since.

There's a new version of this draft
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-duke-quic-version-aliasing/
that has only minor changes.

However, I wrote a new companion draft that mangles the ECHO design to
encrypt initial packets beginning with the first connection. This would be
a new version of QUIC, leveraging some of the lessons from last month's v2
exercise:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-duke-quic-protected-initial/

I wrestled with the crypto piece for a long while, and it could really use
a look from an expert.

Thanks,
Martin