Re: Big TP codespace

Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 16 May 2019 01:47 UTC

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From: Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 18:47:10 -0700
Message-ID: <CACpbDcew+zgZJ2Y7qC+zwoMrGrdzoagB6HtC=z=woNzB6FrhXQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Big TP codespace
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
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Martin, the text in #2691 supports what you want to accomplish, but doesn't
require everyone to do the same thing. I think that's all we need.

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 10:44 AM David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> @ekr, the principle I was endorsing is the one Mike mentioned.
>
> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 10:20 AM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
>
>> We agreed in Tokyo that we would not mandate that implementations check
>> for improper peer behavior when doing so required substantial extra work.
>> Implementations MUST error out on easily-detected errors, but only
>> SHOULD/MAY error on things they would have to actively check (unless
>> they’re already required to actively check for security reasons, in which
>> case there’s no *extra* work).
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* QUIC <quic-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of * Eric Rescorla
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, May 14, 2019 5:21 PM
>> *To:* David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>; Christian Huitema <
>> huitema@huitema.net>; Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: Big TP codespace
>>
>>
>>
>> What's the bigger principle you are endorsing? What errors "like this"
>> are we not requiring detection of?
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 5:19 PM David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Our implementation checks for duplicates only for the transport
>> parameters it supports. I think #2691
>> <https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2691/files> is the correct
>> solution.
>>
>>
>>
>> +1 to the design principle of encouraging but not requiring detection of
>> errors like this
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:06 PM Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema..net>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> > On May 13, 2019, at 1:58 PM, Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > What do people think?
>>
>> I think the general rule of protocol policing should be "MUST NOT" do
>> dastardly stuff, and "MAY" drop the connection when that happens.
>>
>> -- Christian Huitema
>>
>>