Re: Packet number encryption
Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Tue, 06 February 2018 13:35 UTC
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From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 06 Feb 2018 08:35:12 -0500
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Subject: Re: Packet number encryption
To: "Brian Trammell (IETF)" <ietf@trammell.ch>, Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com>
Cc: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com>, "Lubashev, Igor" <ilubashe@akamai.com>
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Some overhead considerations of packet encryption: Sensor and control devices: The power overhead on sensor networks is small compared to just listening on the radio and if not using radio, the latency is probably not critical compared to the speed of encryption. To be a bit sci-fi - low-latency encrypted control signals in robotics might be relevant. Think exo-skeleton hacked by enemy through targeted signal injection. Still, packet number encryption is likely fast enough in such cases. For servers: The overhead of packet encryption (single block AES-CTR) is probably around 100 cycles with AES-NI and possibly 160 cycles table based for one block for Intel arch. This is because parallel multi-block optimisations are not possible. AES-CTR of one block is about the same as AES-CTR of 4 blocks, and GCM auth tag adds perhaps 50% to that. Thus packet number encryption might be twice as fast as AES-GCM of a 64 byte message which is still a 50% overhead. High speed low latency applications might receive a packet concurrently on two cores, one with a fast path reacting specifically to packets containing only small stream messages, and one core handling everything else. The message handler could experience a delay of 50% compared to not encrypting packet numbers. It is not possible to significantly improve on this in hardware because the packet number must be decrypted before AEAD can be applied. That is, unless the encrypted packet number is used as the IV of AEAD in which case encryption gets a new bottleneck but decryption can be processed faster. My take is that I prefer to avoid packet number gaps because they are messy and I don’t believe they provide any significant privacy, but I also don’t like the crypto cost in low-latency scenarios. If the argument is for ossification and not privacy, I think the encryption is the only option as Marten has pointed out. For this reason it makes sense to apply crypto. Low-latency systems could create a QUIC variant that drops the packet encryption. Mikkel On 6 February 2018 at 11.13.40, Brian Trammell (IETF) (ietf@trammell.ch) wrote: > On 6 Feb 2018, at 01:30, Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com> wrote: > > I don't think we're converging here, so I'd like to try and encourage us to move towards it. I have my opinion, but I care more about forward progress at this point. > > There are three designs so far: > 1. Packet numbers as is, with random gaps around migration. > 2. Packet numbers encrypted, as per Martin's PR. > 3. Packet numbers encrypted, plus a small modulo sequence number somewhere. > > The concrete ones here are (1) and (2). I'm listing (3) but am not inclined to consider it seriously, since it's not concrete enough, (and I don't want more bits to be spent in the QUIC packet header if that's where this info goes.) Unsurprisingly, I'm still for (3). :) If a concrete proposal would incline you to consider it seriously, I'm happy to write one or two points in this space up, probably for the list at first. (Indeed, I'll probably go ahead and do this anyway today). > There are opinions about ossification, privacy, and manageability. I'm not hearing bloody murder, so for what it's worth, I'd like to stipulate first that we can all live with the final design, whichever one it is. If anyone disagrees, please say so -- I think it'd be useful to hear if there are folks who think a particular design is fundamentally problematic. > > My opinion is still for (2) over (1), but I can live with either. FWIW, I prefer (2) over (1) as well, modulo a little discomfort about the crypto: the proposed encryption scheme uses a secret derived from the end-to-end secret to ECB-encrypt a plaintext which is completely known to an on-path observer in a place to see all packets in the common case that packets are neither lost nor reordered on the path -- namely the sequence 0x00 - 0x3f, 0x4000 - 0x7fff and so on. I Am Not A Cryptographer, but that property of this algorithm used in this way screams "Call A Cryptographer Before Deploying" to me.) Cheers, Brian > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com> wrote: > Praveen, > > That was precisely my point about the ecosystem evolving. Now that we have the ability to classify flows, various things have been built around being able to tell TCP flows. This obviously has benefits as you point out, but the downside is that that I can't get good network utilization with a single flow. I understand the scaling point, but speaking of common cases, any server in the wild is usually serving a large number of connections at moderate speeds, not a single one at 25-35 Gbps... which makes that sort of scaling less exciting than in a microbenchmark. > > FWIW, the other downside of ECMP is that multipath transport doesn't work -- you need to hash on something else besides the 4-tuple. (We had to work around this in Google's deployment of connection migration.) > > I'll disagree with your point about reordering being the uncommon case. While that's true today, this is again an expectation that the network works hard to maintain, though the ecosystem and what we expect as "usual" would be quite different had we not built TCP's requirements into the network. There's nothing wrong with having n-modal latencies... we can engineer around that. Any sensible load distribution scheme within the network will give you increased variance but it should limit the worst-case latency. You'd perhaps agree that that's a net win. > > This was an example of how exposing packet number or not can have long term ecosystem effects. My point was about the fact that exposing can cause ossification. > > - jana > > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:24 AM, Praveen Balasubramanian < pravb@microsoft.com> wrote: > >> This was definitely true for implementations of TCP, but that is TCP's problem, not the network's > > Flow classification happens through the network and also on the end host with RSS where a flow is mapped to a core. This allows for building high performance receive processing that could be lock free for the most part. The only downside of ECMP on the network and RSS on the CPU is that a single flow will not take multiple paths or get processed on more than one core. Windows on server machines today can saturate 25-35 Gbps for a single TCP connection before being CPU limited. This is a reasonable trade off because I don’t know of cases where a single flow is driving more than that amount of traffic. Assumptions about how flows get classified help make for more efficient processing. They also lead to consistent latency. You do not want the traffic to take a bi-modal or N-modal paths (on the network or the host) to being processed because the fluctuations in latency will hurt the workload. I am not arguing for TCP not being resilient to reordering but IMO that should be the uncommon case not the common case. With QUIC if streams were exposed on the network you could take advantage of stream level ECMP and RSS to scale better than TCP but we have chosen to keep the 4-tuple (or the 5-tuple) as the flow classifier on the network which is ok by me since it leads to TCP parity. > > > > Thanks > > > > From: QUIC [mailto:quic-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jana Iyengar > Sent: Sunday, February 4, 2018 8:35 PM > To: Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> > Cc: Lubashev, Igor <ilubashe@akamai.com>; Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com>; QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org> > Subject: Re: Packet number encryption > > > > Privacy-protection can't be a user choice, for the reasons others have noted on this thread. > > > That said, my primary argument is for encryption to avoid ossification. Not that it matters now, but I'll note that much of GQUIC's original motivation for encrypting headers was to avoid ossification. > > > > I'll reiterate that fields we expose will get ossified and there are long-term ecosystem effects to this. Let me illustrate this with precisely the packet number field. Middleboxes commonly assume that a TCP flow can only handle packets in-order. This assumption comes from the fact that TCP implementations get poor performance when packets are reordered. This was definitely true for implementations of TCP, but that is TCP's problem, not the network's. However, almost all load-balancers I know of now will pin all packets within a TCP flow to one path, leading to sub-optimal performance in the network, and destroying incentives for the endpoints to deploy reordering-resilient TCP implementations (even though there are plenty of ways of doing this.) > > > > Exposing QUIC's packet number field (as any field) is likely to have similar consequences and a similar ecosystem arc. > > > > > > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 7:51 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote: > > > Optional security tends to devolve to non-secure. > > > > That’s a great aphorism. And sadly all too true. > > > > >
- Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eggert, Lars
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Duke
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- Re: Re: Packet number encryption alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Packet number encryption Patrick McManus
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Willy Tarreau
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Reducing ossification through protocol design (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Salz, Rich
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Martin Thomson
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption David Benjamin
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Eggert, Lars
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen