Re: QUIC Version Negotiation Extension

Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Mon, 04 November 2019 23:11 UTC

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Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 00:11:38 +0100
Message-ID: <CAN1APdfHKdUM5HWmNLV1quF5++DOwvUCH8nD+u1EVerWNQg5mg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: QUIC Version Negotiation Extension
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: QUIC <quic@ietf.org>
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Below

On 5 November 2019 at 00.07.01, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com)
wrote:

So this is where I’m not 100% on how it works, but VNEG packet does, at
least in principle, allow for a return destination CID, so the next Initial
packet can use that destination instead of a random original CID. And
likewise, if the response is not via VNEG, the servers initial can the same
(on known versions).


I came to think that because VNEG is open, an attacker could inject a VNEG
with a specific desitination CID to multiple clients and those trigger an
indirect flooding attack by concentrating traffic via previously aquired
destination CIDs. Because the servers router would/should randomize
unauthenticated CIDs an attacker cannot just inject a random CID.