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Re: New confidentiality and integrity limits

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Thu, 16 July 2020 01:40 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 21:40:03 -0400
Message-ID: <CACsn0c=HkByj0dkwfW+0=n9HzGZ0cZamot6N=AFks3wbnwnWXQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: New confidentiality and integrity limits
To: Lucas Pardue <lucaspardue.24.7@gmail.com>
Cc: QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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I do not believe the analysis is correct.

A forgery against a QUIC connection will be checked at one or at most
two keys: the current one and the next one. It is not the case that a
forgery will be attempted against all the keys simultaneously: it will
have to be resent. Perhap I'm missing something about the setting here
that makes this the multiuser and not the singleuser setting.

Sincerely,
Watson

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