Re: Spin Bit -- a Path Forward

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Fri, 23 March 2018 14:28 UTC

Return-Path: <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 534BE12D96C for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:28:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.999
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bfKKWZwJUqnV for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:28:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ot0-x22d.google.com (mail-ot0-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c0f::22d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9311F12DA00 for <quic@ietf.org>; Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:28:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ot0-x22d.google.com with SMTP id 95-v6so13431361ote.5 for <quic@ietf.org>; Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:28:29 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=dzsjU7FNoLwyjS+A+q7ory99UbvpxyAVX+ldHMNS1bc=; b=P2ZW+kXMrsHYQsBihQ5QqxeGFaNuwctf+GelzByr7EUBcMXXzxqQ/fWXeASR8qWmZW oCEvpjbdOfo53SKvCPuKCl6kZVlwBGE77bWTIC3oesZK+JZecOfwS/5BrOCxQA0UAm10 SvD7xupSFlhuuNd4opcRw4dGg72Vju8yQ3pVvHhR81ZtrCjFu36EgKE4iM++eJZvtDq/ KxlEEVMQA1a6ufYtOEcvKNsj2rOUTBPbD6HQgvLasJiQZI6FZZ3Jj5g8yXWn56GRx1w1 KWW7znxzMKapbgfPclIecSnJ47gMTvDvohlG5R9CR+6MZvb4hUDzfuXlcEkW9btTDkfJ VdNA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=dzsjU7FNoLwyjS+A+q7ory99UbvpxyAVX+ldHMNS1bc=; b=i6W/9w8S2id1MLND7BsxeFhbBTgnbDJuslWQ3Ut78o1AmprvNd3ALaKMqGMV8sx49A e8oXqv+MAzTxhw89gAISiZjbgTUJI+Rluhrsig/SJQqjfvu1qo0JgKwq2GBvfWvqsG6X Q5XwI6odLLJBfy1c5BOQ4xz+9BrfcRNlxGwsDjXRs1kO77VVgNbC/DA9idXoYspOi5GS kfbfY2ZGVuURnHOGY8lzI9GsuWhPqqYzbtPWL709qWor+kNVr6awt6EFDuGFPIzUp02w CRCvUvfOYYSDC3BQzYJRBJijcR2NwUTbUpt55cz/5D5bj4GFkp3VSgH3hdUDhR11Ntuj dZwg==
X-Gm-Message-State: AElRT7GXS33fVOIKGkZ9Gtjqlkg+scQmuGqhEswPRvNCgTn7eK1iG5b1 Fe2jyhfmNuTiIts+P/KcKUrYS9a2ymkkuhhicXZCvg==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELsULiR6iVR8D74GJhCjoLrLk5fYn7M3A/gQFFzR1m9Isk5+udXHcNI8X1Kvqs/p+ZcQXcFh+1nJjXX1dpKvlF8=
X-Received: by 2002:a9d:29ea:: with SMTP id g39-v6mr14702974otd.241.1521815308811; Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:28:28 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 2002:a9d:ac7:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:28:28 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <D90555C7-CE24-4073-8E85-E05CFF2D645E@mnot.net>
References: <D90555C7-CE24-4073-8E85-E05CFF2D645E@mnot.net>
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 14:28:28 +0000
Message-ID: <CABkgnnXiUpGhRG2heVDBcybU3o5SuZepo7q4uP2ZkyHnUU1UMg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Spin Bit -- a Path Forward
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic/VLfyL2npiPHVuop2W6SoFh7yuCA>
X-BeenThere: quic@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Main mailing list of the IETF QUIC working group <quic.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 14:28:31 -0000

This captures my understanding well.  I want to clarify a couple of points.

I believe that we don't need to reserve bits in the long header, even
though that has more space available.

For the short header, we currently have a few bits reserved for other
purposes.  Saving two bits is easy though they will not be contiguous,
due to the gQUIC demux bit.  We could have 3 bits if we decided that
STUN demux wasn't a goal.  We will regain one more bit when Google
sort out the migration to IETF QUIC.

On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 2:20 PM, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:
> In London, Thursday's discussion ended up with a plan where:
>
> - The transport draft editors will assure that at least three bits are available for experimentation in the next draft
> - A separate WG document (but not milestone, yet) would be written that would document how to use one of those bits to measure RTT (the "Spin Bit")
> - That document would be an optional part of our upcoming Implementation Draft milestones, to encourage implementation and experimentation
> - However, the "core" documents will NOT yet be affected in any way, beyond the accommodation of bits above
> - Before publishing QUICv1, we'd revisit the status of that document to determine what to do with that document (as well as any other proposals that emerge and have a similar level of review).
>
> This gives us more time to get experience, explore possible alternatives (provided they have adequate review) and assess implementation support, without putting it on our critical path. The final decision regarding the destiny of those bits in QUICv1 (or other possible extensions, versions, etc. to meet these uses) will depend upon the implementation take-up, breadth and quality of experiences reported, and amount and diversity of data collected in our experimentation.
>
> If there is enough interest in using more than one bit for determining RTT (e.g., Brian's VEC), or another proposal, we'll spin up a Design Team to evaluate the privacy implications of doing so (taking into consideration decisions about Packet Number Encryption).
>
> The above is an expanded version of what we discussed in the room (time was constrained). We believe that the sense of the room supported this path forward pretty strongly. If you disagree -- either with the characterisation of what was discussed above, or with the proposed path forward -- please explain why.
>
> Regards,
>
> --
> Mark and Lars, WG Chairs
>