RE: Packet number encryption

Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com> Sun, 04 February 2018 19:31 UTC

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From: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>
To: "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>, huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
CC: Gorry Fairhust <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>, "Lubashev, Igor" <ilubashe@akamai.com>, Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com>, "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>, "Roni Even (A)" <roni.even@huawei.com>, Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com>, "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Piotr Galecki <piotr_galecki@affirmednetworks.com>
Subject: RE: Packet number encryption
Thread-Topic: Packet number encryption
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Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2018 19:31:14 +0000
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>From the charter "This work will ensure that QUIC has security and privacy properties that are at least as good as a stack composed of TLS 1.3  using TCP (or MPTCP when using multipath)."

Is the discussion mainly focused on connection migration which is not present in TCP? There seem to be bigger privacy problems due to DNS and TLS SNI extension so in real deployments will packet number encryption add value other than preventing ossification? 

Is a cryptographically secure random initial packet number and random (forward) jumps in packet number not good enough to prevent ossification? The missing packet number range due to the forward jump could be communicated in the encrypted payload so the receiver knows they are not missing.

Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: QUIC [mailto:quic-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Willy Tarreau
Sent: Sunday, February 4, 2018 10:26 AM
To: huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: Gorry Fairhust <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk>; Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; Brian Trammell <ietf@trammell.ch>; Lubashev, Igor <ilubashe@akamai.com>; Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com>; Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK) <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>; Roni Even (A) <roni.even@huawei.com>; Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>; Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com>; Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com>; QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>; Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>; Piotr Galecki <piotr_galecki@affirmednetworks.com>
Subject: Re: Packet number encryption

On Sun, Feb 04, 2018 at 07:40:41AM -1000, Christian Huitema wrote:
> Negotiate privacy off in the name of network performance? Very 
> slippery slope! For example, the connections that do require privacy would stick out.

Well, I personally have stopped fighting on this subject. I've long been bored by the obsession of this so-called "privacy" which justifies any possible protocol degradation and loss of efficiency to hide I-don't- know-what, even sometimes destroying basic security at the same time.

Today, people who want to hide their activities use VPNs. Those of us having had to help diagnose network issues on IPSEC connections know that you can't debug anything and that the only fix is to try to randomly replace elements and settings on the path, and to ultimately get rid of this protocol in favor of other solutions with less moving parts.

Yes I too am a bit worried about what QUIC will become. The lack of observability may even result in the impossibility at all to build a working firewall to protect the users. Thus instead of nasty people just counting packets on the wire, they'll have an open path to remotely install malware into their victim's devices without any possibility for them to be protected, leaking all their data and history even more easily than today.

The Internet infrastructure is robust and fragile at the same time, it's robust against attacks and hardware failures, but it's fragile in front of design mistakes, especially if they're deployed on each and every browser and/or web server. I think it's important to take care of it and to ensure it always remains possible to heal it and to enhance it.

I'd rather see some choices offered to the end user in fact. Just like right now some decide to use a VPN, some may decide to enable some super-privacy features that possibly make their connections a bit less reliable, less performant, and prevent them from using an efficient firewall, but it will be their choice at least. And it would allow us to go even further in the privacy domain, possibly contemplating options making it even harder to fix protocol issues but protect users better (eg: the spin bit was a tradeoff to satisfy everyone, with an opt-in solution it's not even needed anymore).

Having a bit indicate if the sequence number is encrypted or not could be enough :
  - the sender decides to use clear sequence numbers and clears the bit
  - the sender decides to use encrypted sequence numbers and sets the bit.
  - the receiver knows how to decode the sequence number based on this bit.
  - a middle box could not achieve anything by clearing this bit since it
    would mean that the resulting values would appear as almost random and
    would not be usable by the other end.

Just my two cents,
Willy