Re: Asymmetric CIDs
Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> Fri, 16 February 2018 19:08 UTC
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From: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 11:08:14 -0800
Message-ID: <CAM4esxQYOTpPKrKDhps=_iX5P0DQw=gXV_mOCJrSRwAd5BB5aw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Asymmetric CIDs
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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That sounds workable to me. Thanks for clarifying. However, if this is the case then how is Stateless Reset broken? If a load balancer is encoding different lengths in the CID, that introduces additional overhead to a LB/Server communication protocol as I've drafted. It's solvable but annoying. On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 10:38 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:52 AM, Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Thanks for writing this up, ekr. This incorporates many of the >> suggestions I made in objection to this project (perhaps coincidentally) >> and I like it a lot. >> >> Advantages of this: >> - In the common case where most of the data is server->client, clients >> can get away with shorter Conn IDs to reduce overhead. >> - Omit-conn-id just becomes a case where length = 0. Does this sidestep >> some of Google's transition issues? >> - If a client sends NEW_CONNECTION_ID, that indicates an intention to >> migrate, and is a good cue for the server to send the same. We should add a >> SHOULD to specify this behavior. >> >> I must be missing something, however, regarding implicit CIDs. >> >> If there's a NAT rebinding, how is the server supposed to extract the >> CID? >> > > The assumption is that the server either: > > (a) always uses the same CID length > (b) has a structured CID which starts with the length. > > But that we don't need to mandate which one in the protoocl > > >> Furthermore, this obviates the entire concept of using Connection ID for >> routing; it's not obviously a savings to store CID length in a table vs. >> just storing the destination server. >> > > I don't think you hae to do this, but maybe I am confused. See above and > tell me if you think I'm wrong > > -Ekr > > >> Lastly, if we encode the length somewhere that seems to solve the >> Stateless Reset issue. >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:25 AM, Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com> wrote: >> >>> Thanks for the excellent summary EKR. I like this design and think the >>> breakage of stateless reset in certain cases is acceptable, since it only >>> applies if both sides must have their preferred connection ID present in >>> order to route correctly, which is a use case that's impossible in the >>> status quo. I have not come up with any other downsides. >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 12:01 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi folks, >>>> >>>> After a bunch of discussion, the CID task force came down to rough >>>> consensus that asymmetric conn IDs were probably the right >>>> direction (CID task force members, please feel free to voice dissent >>>> here). Here's a complete writeup of what I think would be needed >>>> for asymmetric connection IDs. It's not a PR, because I think >>>> something self-contained is cleaner. >>>> >>>> Note that if we adopt this direction, we would be sacrificing >>>> public reset under some conditions (see previous emails to the >>>> list) and we would need to decide if it was worth keeping at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> OVERVIEW >>>> The basic idea is that each side gets to dictate the connection IDs >>>> that are used to send to it. During the handshake, you establish those >>>> CIDs and then each side can issue new CIDs during the connection. The >>>> main advantage of this is that it allows for symmetric topologies in >>>> which >>>> the client is also behind some kind of stateless LB/router rather than >>>> just the server. See Issue #1091 for more info on this. >>>> >>>> >>>> The overall handshake looks something like this: >>>> >>>> Client Server >>>> >>>> Initial [CID=XXX] {recv-CID=YYY} ----------------> >>>> <-------------- Cleartext [CID=YYY] {recv-CID=ZZZ} >>>> Cleartext [CID=ZZZ], {recv-CID=YYY} -------------> >>>> <-------------------------- Short header [CID=YYY] >>>> Short header [CID=ZZZ] --------------------------> >>>> >>>> >>>> The client's initial CID (XXX) is special, and either consists of >>>> >>>> (a) a randomly chosen dummy CID. Proposal: require this to be >>>> 8 bytes or at least a minimum. This should be the same >>>> for all Initial packets in a connection (unless a stateless >>>> reject is received, as below). >>>> (b) a CID which it received from the server in a stateless reject >>>> >>>> All the server's packets are sent with the client's receive CID (YYY) >>>> and all subsequent client packets are sent with the server's receive >>>> CID (ZZZ). The general rule is that you should send with the >>>> connection ID that you most recently received (where recently >>>> is defined as highest PN). >>>> >>>> Note: I believe it's safe to just use the sending CID as the mixin >>>> for the KDF, but I haven't thought this entirely through yet. >>>> >>>> Finally, you can send NEW_CONNECTION_ID in either direction to provide >>>> a new connection ID for the other side to use. The general assumption >>>> is that you can do this at any time, just as with current QUIC, and >>>> that any time you send to a new remote 3-tuple you should change CIDs >>>> if you can. Note that this means that endpoints should try to make >>>> sure that the other side has spare CIDs in case they need to migrate. >>>> >>>> >>>> WIRE ENCODING >>>> As we discussed in the meeting the short header should just have >>>> an implicit length CID. This gives us the following short header: >>>> >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> |0|C|K| Type (5)| >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | | >>>> + [Connection ID (*)] + >>>> <- change from 64 >>>> | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | Packet Number (8/16/32) ... >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | Protected Payload (*) ... >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> >>>> Note that we may also be able to dispense with the C bit, if each >>>> side just gets to say "send me this CID exactly", why do we want >>>> to say "here is my CID but you can omit it". >>>> >>>> >>>> We have several options about the long header. The first question >>>> is where recv-CIDs go. In previous versions I suggested putting >>>> them in transport parameters, or elsewhere in the TLS handshake, >>>> and that might still be viable, though it has some drawbacks [0], >>>> so the other alternative is to put both CIDs in in the long header. >>>> This would look something like: >>>> >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> |1| Type (7) | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | DCID-Length | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Dst Connection ID (*) + >>>> | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | SCID-Length | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Src Connection ID (*) + >>>> | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | Version (32) | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | Packet Number (32) | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | Payload (*) ... >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> >>>> The semantics here are that the first value is the CID you want to >>>> send to and the second one is the value you want used to send to you >>>> (I've inverted these to keep the order the same as short header). >>>> >>>> Two notes about this encoding: >>>> >>>> 1. I think we agreed that we didn't want arbitrary length CIDs up to >>>> 255 bytes, and yet we have room in this length byte. I propose we >>>> limit it to 31 bytes and then grease the remaining 3 bits [1]. >>>> >>>> 2. Because the client sends its CID first, there's no way to get the >>>> current QUIC semantics of the server just dictates the CID. I propose >>>> we fix that by defining a special sentinel CID (all 1s, all 0s, >>>> whatever) of whatever our maximum length is that means "just use your >>>> own CID". >>>> >>>> We can endlessly bikeshed on this structure. >>>> >>>> >>>> Finally, we will need to update NEW_CONNECTION_ID to allow a variable >>>> length CID. This would look like this: >>>> >>>> 0 1 2 3 >>>> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | Sequence (i) ... >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | CID-Length | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Connection ID (*) + >>>> | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> | | >>>> + + >>>> | | >>>> + Stateless Reset Token (128) + >>>> | | >>>> + + >>>> | | >>>> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> [0] However, in the transport parameters design, if the server's >>>> handshake gets reordered, the client might need to send some ACKs with >>>> the initial CID. However, we've agreed that the client's IP address >>>> has to be stable, so this isn't a problem. Alternately, you could >>>> change C->S CIDs in the short header if that was easier. >>>> >>>> [1] An alternative would be to have a sparse range (e.g., you can >>>> express 0-7 and then 8-22 by 2s, assuming I have counted correctly) >>>> and then we could pack both lengths into a single byte. As I said, >>>> lots of opportunities for bikeshedding here. >>>> >>>> >>> >> >
- Asymmetric CIDs Eric Rescorla
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Ian Swett
- RE: Asymmetric CIDs Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Ted Hardie
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Martin Duke
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Christian Huitema
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Roberto Peon
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Eric Rescorla
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Martin Duke
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Eric Rescorla
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Christian Huitema
- RE: Asymmetric CIDs Nick Banks
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Ian Swett
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Roberto Peon
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Christian Huitema
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Martin Thomson
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Asymmetric CIDs Kazuho Oku