Re: Packet number encryption
Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Wed, 21 February 2018 14:13 UTC
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From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 09:13:37 -0500
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Subject: Re: Packet number encryption
To: Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com>, Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Cc: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>, "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>, huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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Sorry for the mail flux, but using encrypted packet numbers as nonce would not even be possible with the current proposal, because the nonce must be known before the packet number is encrypted. On 21 February 2018 at 15.09.16, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com) wrote: If the encrypted packet number is truncated, e.g. wrapping after 4 octets, it would not be possible to use the encrypted packet number as a nonce unless it is acceptable to use that octets that follow, which could be hard to justify. The alternative is to either a) have full length packet numbers, b) renegotiate keys before wrap, c) drop the CCM header and compute it based on the decrypted packet number - which saves space as discussed below, but which also interferes with plain TLS CCM operation. As I have argued before, it might be simpler to simply have a 32-bit sequential counter and restrict it to a single path, then user the upper implicit bits for a path identifier (segmented packet numbers). In this case there is no encryption overhead and the CCM nonce is trivially available. The only remaining question is if the packet number should be redundant in both the QUIC header and the CCM header. This could further be generalised by moving the packet number out of the QUIC and into an AEAD specific header field - but that of course impacts monitoring and ossification. Kind Regards, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen On 21 February 2018 at 14.53.23, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com) wrote: I suppose that CCM is not a major concern since the nonce would be computed from the encrypted packet number and thus not reveal anything surprising. It does, however, add a fair bit of overhead: 16 bytes of CCM header including nonce and length data. 0 padded authenticated data so the packet header will consume 16 octets. This includes the now redundant encrypted packet number. At the is a 0-15 octet padding which on might be 7.5 octets on average, or 0 if the packet is filled perfectly, and of course the 16 octet auth tag. This means that CCM mode will use at least 3x16 octets and addition to encrypted payload and UDP headers. It would probably be easy to remove 32 octets of that overhead, but it would require special adaptation of CCM for QUIC that might not be worthwhile - as we wait for devices that include GCM hardware support. Kind Regards, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen On 21 February 2018 at 13.42.12, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com) wrote: Maybe I’m missing something (such as exactly how TLS/QUIC maps encryption headers to packets: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-08#section-5.3 but it appears that the packet number encryption / linkage discussion is focused entirely on AES-GCM. The CCM mode which is part of TLS 1.3 has a header of 16 octets that includes a nonce. This nonce would appear to the packet number. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3610 In summary: CCM has the unencrypted form H, LA, A, PA, LM, M, PM, T where H is a 16 octets header including nonce, LA is a length or the authenticated data A, LM is the length of the plain text data M, PA and PM is 0-padding up to block length, and T is tag of up to 16 octets. Some fields optional depending on first octet (flag) in H. T is computed as a chain of AES encryptions. Encryption is applied to LM, M, PM, T in CTR mode. (I suppose there is also padding after A). CCM is relevant to devices that have AES acceleration but no CLMUL instruction for GHASH needed by efficient AES-GCM implementations. E.g. ESP32 microcontrollers: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22495.html Of course the CCM header could partly or fully be removed if the authenticated data and encrypted data lengths can be implied otherwise, or part of it could be encrypted. On 12 February 2018 at 12.49.38, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com) wrote: I can add some more numbers here https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl The numbers deducted from Solarflare report is interesting, however I am not sure if that reflects the ordinary use of a protocol; my understanding is that HFT is exceptional. HFT is the extreme case which is why the benchmark is interesting, not necessarily the use case itself. The same concern applies to how fast a distributed database can achieve consensus, which is something I do care about. On 12 February 2018 at 12.44.01, Kazuho Oku (kazuhooku@gmail.com) wrote: Victor, Mikkel, thank you for the estimations. To me it seems that the estimated overhead of 0.1% seems like a natural number that we would see on production environment, where the average packet size is not small. I also agree that it would be worthwhile to look the case where small packets are exchanged. The numbers deducted from Solarflare report is interesting, however I am not sure if that reflects the ordinary use of a protocol; my understanding is that HFT is exceptional. One benchmark that might give us a more meaningful number is the DNS benchmark. https://www.knot-dns.cz/benchmark/ lists a benchmark of several authoritative DNS servers. The TLD benchmark and the Hosting (10k) benchmark gives us the rough estimation on how much PPS we can achieve when exchanging small packets. The numbers we see on the benchmark is roughly 2M RPS (4M pps) on a 16 core (8x2) Intel Xeon processer running with HP enabled, when the fastest DNS server is being used. Running `openssl speed -evp` on a similar CPU gives me the following result: $ /usr/local/openssl-1.1.0/bin/openssl speed -evp aes128 Doing aes-128-cbc for 3s on 16 size blocks: 133387877 aes-128-cbc's in 3.00s This shows that 40M AES block operations can be run on a single core, per second, which in turn means that a server with 16 cores can perform 640M AES block operations per second (or 1,280M if HT is enabled and if AES is not the bottleneck). To summarize, if DNS had packet encryption, the overhead would be somewhere from 0.3% to 0.6%. Considering that, I would anticipate that the overhead of packet number encryption will be neglible even for short packet workloads. 2018-02-12 16:19 GMT+09:00 Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com>: > I have no idea how you get that number (by which I mean, I have a lot of > guesses, but none of which are solid or useful here). I looked at the > profiles of various workloads we're running in production, and I estimate > that none of them would be impacted by PN encryption by worse than 0.1%. > > On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Praveen Balasubramanian > <pravb@microsoft.com> wrote: >> >> Makes sense. The 1%+ overhead I had quoted was in comparison to full >> protocol processing all the way from app to NIC. This is with an unoptimized >> early QUIC implementation and not fully optimized UDP/IP stack (we have >> focused much much more on optimizing TCP in the past). After software stack >> optimizations, the crypto share of the cost will only keep going up for >> which we have no technique other than to offload when such support is >> available in hardware and offload is way more challenging when workload is >> hosted in VMs and containers. >> >> >> >> From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen [mailto:mikkelfj@gmail.com] >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 3:36 AM >> To: Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com> >> Cc: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>; quic@ietf.org; Marten >> Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>; huitema <huitema@huitema.net> >> Subject: Re: Packet number encryption >> >> >> >> To put numbers into perspective using Intel 2015 data >> >> >> >> >> https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-openssl-performance#_Toc416943490 >> >> >> >> A 64 byte message in AES-GCM AEAD in HW would use 1.03 cycles per byte or >> 66 cycles total, or 22ns on a 3GHz core. >> >> >> >> For packet numbers we use the CBC encrypt numbers because here AES cannot >> exploit block parallelism. >> >> Here we see 4.44 cycles/byte in HW or 71 cycles per block. With a 3GHz >> setup that would amount to about 24ns overhead for packet encryption. >> >> >> >> Clearly it makes no sense that AES-GCM is faster than a single AES block >> encryption, but these are only approximate numbers and CBC mode might have a >> little overhead, so we clamp packet numbers to 22ns. >> >> >> >> Taking the 98ns overhead by the Solarflare report we get a total >> (simplified) processing time is 98ns non-crypto, 22ns for packet number, and >> 22ns for AEAD totalling 142ns. So the packet number encryption overhead >> would be 22/(98+22)*100% = 18%. The numbers ignore other QUIC bookkeeping, >> but that can be done in other cores or outside the latency critical window. >> >> >> >> This does not take into account that AEAD operation may operate less than >> optimal because the packet number must be extracted first. On the other >> hand, it is also not a disastrous overhead if no good alternative can be >> found. >> >> >> >> Earlier AES-NI I’ve seen from Intel doc suggests around 100cycles in HW >> for a single AES-128 block which would be 33ns per packet number in the >> above example. >> >> >> >> On 10 February 2018 at 06.18.25, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen >> (mikkelfj@gmail.com) wrote: >> >> 98ns for 68 byte messages > > -- Kazuho Oku
- Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eggert, Lars
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Duke
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- Re: Re: Packet number encryption alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Packet number encryption Patrick McManus
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Willy Tarreau
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Reducing ossification through protocol design (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Salz, Rich
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Martin Thomson
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption David Benjamin
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Eggert, Lars
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen