RE: Proposal: Run QUIC over DTLS

Lucas Pardue <Lucas.Pardue@bbc.co.uk> Tue, 06 March 2018 13:47 UTC

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From: Lucas Pardue <Lucas.Pardue@bbc.co.uk>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Proposal: Run QUIC over DTLS
Thread-Topic: Proposal: Run QUIC over DTLS
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Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 13:47:00 +0000
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Hi,

From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:ekr@rtfm.com]
Sent: 06 March 2018 00:42
To: Lucas Pardue <Lucas.Pardue@bbc.co.uk>;
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>;
Subject: Re: Proposal: Run QUIC over DTLS

On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 3:58 PM, Lucas Pardue <Lucas.Pardue@bbc.co.uk<mailto:Lucas.Pardue@bbc.co.uk>> wrote:
Hi EKR,

This is a very interesting proposal, especially because I have little experience with DTLS. (I also have little experience with QUIC's use of TLS 1.3 so can't comment too strongly in that regard).

One aspect of the current QUIC design I like is the separation between key exchange and packet protection. Which allows some alternative use cases. So I read your draft and was not sure if DTLS maintains that possibility or not. Section 6.4 seems to touch on this topic but I wasn't sure if you are asserting the flexibility exists nor or could exist with some work. The link to draft-putman-tls13-preshared-dh "Authenticated Key Agreement using Pre-Shared Asymmetric Keypairs" is quite well aligned to to the use case I was thinking of. It would be nice to leverage such work rather than have to reinvent it for QUIC's current design.

Hi Lucas,

DTLS and TLS have pretty similar designs in this respect (DTLS is primarily a thin reliability layer on the TLS handshake), and in general TLS has key exchange and packet protection separated, in much the same way things are in the current QUIC design, just with a different packet encryption.

TLS is explicitly designed to allow for flexibility in the crypto core, so I would imagine we're going to see a bunch of innovation there over the next few years. The putman draft is one example of what people are looking at, but I'm aware of others as well.

-Ekr


Thanks for the clarification!

Lucas



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