RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption)
Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> Thu, 05 April 2018 17:27 UTC
Return-Path: <mbishop@evequefou.be>
X-Original-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0360A126D3F for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 5 Apr 2018 10:27:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.889
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.889 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=evequefou.onmicrosoft.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cSATDvd7MhMT for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 5 Apr 2018 10:27:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAM03-DM3-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-dm3nam03on0724.outbound.protection.outlook.com [IPv6:2a01:111:f400:fe49::724]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8E7A41271DF for <quic@ietf.org>; Thu, 5 Apr 2018 10:27:13 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=evequefou.onmicrosoft.com; s=selector1-evequefou-be; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version; bh=NbWz/TLQfOrw7af6jkv74d2tlCFlNwag0eL8EslkR+w=; b=UzrrPctsa1L1ZICESIXoKD/I3D7teYDBtKya5spgVjNRXHdrzizxFX/T6R2ftWQlWIoKxhv/n20GYzQZgxG5Xjep4Piixp19upW4/7pBElvOitjYmzJQ/IKfjZ5dZyQ41/ygkc+luoGFuAa+4+TKhWIVcbpd3l4QqYYnrCkxPKg=
Received: from SN1PR08MB1854.namprd08.prod.outlook.com (10.169.39.8) by SN1PR08MB1391.namprd08.prod.outlook.com (10.162.1.149) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384_P256) id 15.20.653.12; Thu, 5 Apr 2018 17:27:10 +0000
Received: from SN1PR08MB1854.namprd08.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::e9d8:1358:e716:ba77]) by SN1PR08MB1854.namprd08.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::e9d8:1358:e716:ba77%13]) with mapi id 15.20.0653.013; Thu, 5 Apr 2018 17:27:10 +0000
From: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>
To: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
CC: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, Frederick Kautz <fkautz@alumni.cmu.edu>
Subject: RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption)
Thread-Topic: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption)
Thread-Index: AQHTzPOeIdtMxyMgr0ikidMd5Tq1W6PyVBwAgAACsQCAABOkAIAAAGeQ
Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2018 17:27:10 +0000
Message-ID: <SN1PR08MB1854010FD61AC17D19E497FDDABB0@SN1PR08MB1854.namprd08.prod.outlook.com>
References: <7fd34142-2e14-e383-1f65-bc3ca657576c@huitema.net> <BBB8D1DE-25F8-4F3D-B274-C317848DE872@akamai.com> <CAN1APdd=47b2eXkvMg+Q_+P254xo4vo-Tu-YQu6XoUGMByO_eQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAKcm_gMpz4MpdmrHLtC8MvTf5uO9LjD915jM-i2LfpKY384O2w@mail.gmail.com> <HE1PR0702MB3611A67E764EE1C7D1644FAD84AD0@HE1PR0702MB3611.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com> <d8e35569-e939-4064-9ec4-2cccfba2f341@huitema.net> <CACpbDccqKoF-Y1poHMN2cLOK9GOuvtMTPsF-QEen3b30kUo9bg@mail.gmail.com> <CAKcm_gNffwpraF-H2LQBF33vUhYFx0bi_UXJ3N14k4Xj4NmWUw@mail.gmail.com> <40C1F6FE-2B2C-469F-8F98-66329703ED50@mnot.net> <21C36B57-6AE2-40EF-9549-7196D7FA9B45@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <B176FC07-887D-4135-B01E-FE8B4986A5EE@mnot.net> <CAKcm_gOCeocLyrYpOS7Ud332xdz3xHSH0psPN8T6BGRjoL9ptQ@mail.gmail.com> <CY4PR21MB0630FA0EDD343396AD414641B6A40@CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> <CAN1APde13JTzCvKFFvMd183Fka6QGD1kGBjsa9fcoLrYeA2hsA@mail.gmail.com> <CY4PR21MB0630C0FD4FBECBFEC3C863BBB6A40@CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> <759C5BE4-DE4C-4A82-929C-B03234B88A37@huitema.net> <CAJGwveB=qs+J2iBQRs3d5jdGuP9yBWoAgv0t3mwD=Wrf6Q5g8g@mail.gmail.com> <F395D018-FFCA-405F-BBD5-1313C6F6DAF9@huitema.net> <CANatvzy8zTFKs-c-rR0jMSHdh2HJMvZrRmcR5A+b6qNpNPzkrw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CANatvzy8zTFKs-c-rR0jMSHdh2HJMvZrRmcR5A+b6qNpNPzkrw@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
authentication-results: spf=none (sender IP is ) smtp.mailfrom=mbishop@evequefou.be;
x-originating-ip: [38.134.241.6]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-microsoft-exchange-diagnostics: 1; SN1PR08MB1391; 7:JT58Me2LbrHlV5ysbvjQuBaMbO5dNCleitzrYX6IXoTGyHzi4t9Cz5rTnNq0QUxxdMsWeV8Lksl5S5nABO4FiPIhpSctbk9dB0eh9remIZ7aDK3r0EpXROEmYt4t/w/Osex2LV0F2PmNN4qjyt8tHMOU7a4ROxxIZiZsyguSLP2Zv4t7jE5a4aQYU1m1+2PqbT183BgK03zXKGkZHUg3wEa++g0EFk7v8LJjYdHlvYSi7of3j4sW792GPkWoQDYm
x-ms-exchange-antispam-srfa-diagnostics: SOS;
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 095c9d97-39ba-4968-79d5-08d59b1a7679
x-microsoft-antispam: UriScan:; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(7020095)(4652020)(7021125)(5600026)(4604075)(3008032)(4534165)(7022125)(4603075)(4627221)(201702281549075)(7048125)(7024125)(7027125)(7028125)(7023125)(2017052603328)(7153060)(7193020); SRVR:SN1PR08MB1391;
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: SN1PR08MB1391:
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <SN1PR08MB1391D76C88AE605C61697637DABB0@SN1PR08MB1391.namprd08.prod.outlook.com>
x-exchange-antispam-report-test: UriScan:(28532068793085)(100405760836317)(21748063052155)(17755550239193);
x-exchange-antispam-report-cfa-test: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(6040522)(2401047)(5005006)(8121501046)(10201501046)(93006095)(93001095)(3002001)(3231221)(944501327)(52105095)(6041310)(2016111802025)(20161123560045)(20161123562045)(20161123564045)(20161123558120)(6072148)(6043046)(201708071742011); SRVR:SN1PR08MB1391; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:; SRVR:SN1PR08MB1391;
x-forefront-prvs: 06339BAE63
x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10019020)(346002)(39380400002)(39830400003)(396003)(376002)(366004)(199004)(13464003)(189003)(377424004)(8676002)(2900100001)(7696005)(106356001)(76176011)(39060400002)(316002)(25786009)(5660300001)(81166006)(33656002)(486006)(3660700001)(81156014)(93886005)(99286004)(4326008)(229853002)(97736004)(6246003)(478600001)(790700001)(6116002)(3846002)(3280700002)(14454004)(186003)(55016002)(66066001)(6436002)(476003)(11346002)(446003)(5250100002)(2906002)(54906003)(8936002)(6506007)(53546011)(110136005)(7736002)(26005)(74316002)(53936002)(86362001)(74482002)(236005)(9686003)(6306002)(54896002)(68736007)(102836004)(105586002); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; SCL:1; SRVR:SN1PR08MB1391; H:SN1PR08MB1854.namprd08.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; LANG:en; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:0; MX:1;
received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: evequefou.be does not designate permitted sender hosts)
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: r5C4fX+SJFtqr6VOTuT25PvJfRx9gzw1Jd5rw3vlVN+tCvvOu4J2agaiOtqsocW17tUn5+st+CdnXDq9/aXLxWT9U11SQn5bM7xq9DJOWpwUop2CZLF18lOcsnHOMSgtO+dHSyXUgiCoN4e9y6AHy+T5M+0k9WA/a6UJI6jaMHrYLyP4zrE1wkuNFdtIHnovQHex1DSFmIYfq57UXHc1WCOSA+nvvzbXqkVHTQvAQRXfNLj+ndpFgIAaM19/c2xSaS41fyjiv9u8M9Njlx/GtcEry2HDyLXRNcXql5zl8rgMCRbq5zJv0zV9NBeSRnjjU/iydbkH6dz+lW9PmfijEdfLI97Kzr3m2/UgycAcjkhi6piNOqd5ZXsqxqTNTbATPuoY/gj37J7dtP5Zri5iqyhLq2A1SVmLeLBf/9qYZJs=
spamdiagnosticoutput: 1:99
spamdiagnosticmetadata: NSPM
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_SN1PR08MB1854010FD61AC17D19E497FDDABB0SN1PR08MB1854namp_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: evequefou.be
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 095c9d97-39ba-4968-79d5-08d59b1a7679
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 05 Apr 2018 17:27:10.0670 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 41eaf50b-882d-47eb-8c4c-0b5b76a9da8f
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN1PR08MB1391
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic/gg0iH0RU37PgnMI8LK8t8XYIGQg>
X-BeenThere: quic@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Main mailing list of the IETF QUIC working group <quic.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2018 17:27:17 -0000
Spec says: An endpoint MUST NOT return to the send rate used for the previous path unless it is reasonably sure that the previous send rate is valid for the new path. For instance, a change in the client’s port number is likely indicative of a rebinding in a middlebox and not a complete change in path. This determination likely depends on heuristics, which could be imperfect; if the new path capacity is significantly reduced, ultimately this relies on the congestion controller responding to congestion signals and reducing send rates appropriately. You're not required to reset the CWND if you have reason to believe the underlying path is the same, so doing this shouldn’t cause any transport information to get reset. -----Original Message----- From: QUIC [mailto:quic-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kazuho Oku Sent: Thursday, April 5, 2018 10:19 AM To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>; Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>; Frederick Kautz <fkautz@alumni.cmu.edu> Subject: Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption) 2018-04-06 1:08 GMT+09:00 Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net<mailto:huitema@huitema.net>>: > > >> On Apr 5, 2018, at 8:58 AM, Frederick Kautz <fkautz@alumni.cmu.edu<mailto:fkautz@alumni.cmu.edu>> wrote: >> >> Are you concerned that middleware boxes may be trained to reject migrations, thereby forcing a new connection with a visible negotiation? > > Yes. Hence the need to grease. For example, have clients do some gratuitous migration to a new source port number rather frequently. I agree that it might be a good idea to grease. OTOH I do not think that gratuitous migration would be a good solution due to performance issues. We would be required to start from INITCWND every time the client switches to a new address. The fact that we cannot run two paths simultaneously in QUIC v1 makes the performance drawback big. Rather, I'd prefer making handshake packets indistinguishable from short header packets. In essence, you move the flags of the long header inside the AEAD-protected area. An endpoint that receives a packet carrying a CID that does not belong to any known connection trial-decrypts the packet as a initial packet and handles it as a connection initiation, or sends a stateful reset if the trial-decryption fails. > -- Christian Huitema -- Kazuho Oku
- Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Salz, Rich
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Watson Ladd
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Getting to consensus on packet number encryption Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to consen… Lars Eggert
- Re: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Philipp S. Tiesel
- Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on p… Christian Huitema
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Willy Tarreau
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State (was… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes Roland Zink
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Martin Thomson
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes Ian Swett
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Bona fide loss measurement bits alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Christian Huitema
- RE: Privacy holes Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Ian Swett
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Erik Kline
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Boris Pismenny
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Salz, Rich
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Jana Iyengar
- RE: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Gorry Fairhurst
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema