Re: QUIC Version Negotiation Extension

Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Mon, 04 November 2019 23:07 UTC

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Subject: Re: QUIC Version Negotiation Extension
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: QUIC <quic@ietf.org>
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Yes all lists of versions are ordered.
>
> I might have missed it, but otherwise I think this should be mentioned
> explicitly.
>
Isn't it mentioned in the definitions of these fields?

Yes, rereading that passage, it does mention order.


>> - It is tempting to just hash the received version list, but that
>> requires agreeing on an algorithm, unless the algorithm is stated to be
>> specific to that version, which is complicated.
>>
>
> Which list are you referring to? For all the ones in the draft, the peer
> needs access to all the elements so I don't think a hash would help.
>
> I am referring the received list. The client receives the list. The server
> (modulo redeployment/routing) knows its own list and does not need to read
> it, it just needs proof that the response matches what it initially sent.
> This could be done with a hash. (If I understand correctly). But maybe not
> because the list is filtered by clients input so that would be many hashes
> to track.
>
I don't know what the received list is, there's nothing with that name in
the draft.


Received Negotiation Version Count + following element


The current design of connection IDs does not guarantee consistent routing
on client-generated server connection IDs, so I don't think we can rely on
it.

So this is where I’m not 100% on how it works, but VNEG packet does, at
least in principle, allow for a return destination CID, so the next Initial
packet can use that destination instead of a random original CID. And
likewise, if the response is not via VNEG, the servers initial can the same
(on known versions).

I think QUICv3 should also provide this property, otherwise it'll be likely
to be unsafe. If a future version doesn't have authenticated transport
parameters then we'll have to create a separate downgrade prevention
mechanism. But we can cross that bridge when we get there.

Sure, but perhaps mention in Security Considerations, that the design
depends on this, if it is not considered blatantly obvious.

It sounds like we could be clearer. Would you be able to send us a PR?

I’ll consider, but I’m stretched a bit thin as it is.