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Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 05 April 2018 04:35 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2018 14:35:34 +1000
Message-ID: <CABkgnnV8ya_YdhU1VE+BuiMvuuZOO1-j-2=YHAGbmdE3OMk7Gg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption
To: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Cc: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>, Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 10:57 AM, Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> wrote:
> It is true that #1079 has issues with hardware crypto offload. I am
> happy to support switching to a better encryption scheme (if we find
> one) at any moment; e.g., during the standardization of QUICv1, or as
> an extension to v1, or part of vX.

Until this came up, I hadn't considered the use of an
extension/transport parameter to negotiate a new scheme, but it's
obvious.  This fits best with my view of things.

If that means that we get the DC-QUIC option that turns the packet
number encryption function into identity or some cheaper function,
then I think that's an OK outcome.  We should stop pretending that one
size fits all is achievable; it's not been the case for years already.

FWIW, what I got from the info that Praveen and Ian have shared is
that there are enough problems to solve with UDP that worrying about
the performance hit from encryption is premature.

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