Re: Is the invariants draft really standards track?

[Martin Duke <[e-mail]>]

>  The problem of the DOS protection box is to drop as much traffic as
possible while still letting some good in, and also without causing
performance hits when there are no attacks. There are indeed some thorny
traffic management issues there. More information helps, and Ben's
suggestion to look at DOTS is certainly on point.

I am not sure how any of this can work when inbound 1RTT packets can come
with essentially random IP/port and CID and potentially be valid, given
there might have been a migration. Some of the QUIC-LB modes at least make
it hard to guess your way to a valid CID.

DOTS is an intriguing idea, but again I'm not sure what signatures one
could use to configure it.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 3:43 PM Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>
> On 6/19/2020 3:05 PM, Ted Hardie wrote:
>
> Hi Christian,
>
> A question in-line,
>
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 2:49 PM Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>> When under DOS attack, you want to "minimize blowback", i.e., as much as
>> possible avoid generating packets in response to attack traffic. So, yes, a
>> server may choose to not send stateless resets to anyone when under attack;
>> in fact, my recommendation would be that a server SHOULD NOT send stateless
>> resets to anyone when under attack.
>>
>> That said, Igor raised an interesting point about return traffic. It
>> would be very nice if DOS protection boxes could distinguish between
>> "validated traffic" that the server presumably intends to process, and
>> "unsolicited traffic" that will just consume resource. The box can then
>> reserve some share of the resource for validated traffic, and place the
>> rest of the traffic in a lower priority queue. Fine, but there needs to be
>> a test. The classic test is that incoming traffic is "validated" if the
>> protection box can match it with return traffic coming from the server --
>> for some definition of matching.
>>
>> From that point of view, stateless reset is definitely not helpful. But
>> problematic traffic goes beyond that. The server will reply to a client's
>> initial with a server's initial packet. Does that validate the response
>> traffic? OK, maybe the protection box can programmed to only validate
>> traffic if it sees 1RTT packets. But many servers will send 1-RTT packets
>> as 0.5 RTT. Does that validate the response traffic?
>>
>> We might say that traffic is validated when the handshake is confirmed,
>> but the protection box does not understand the TLS handshake, it just sees
>> packet types and packet sizes. It cannot distinguish between 0.5RTT data
>> and 1RTT data, and thus the closest approximation of "validation" would be
>> seeing more than an initial window worth of traffic coming back from the
>> server. That does not sound great.
>>
>> On the other hand, things get much better if the server under attack can
>> adopt a defensive posture and help the DOS protection box do its job.
>> Suppose that a server can detect that it is under attack -- or be
>> explicitly configured so. The simplest defensive posture would be to (1)
>> disable stateless reset and (2) not send any 0.5RTT packet, including in
>> response to 0-RTT. The protection boxes can at that point take the 1-RTT
>> packets from the server as indicating validation.
>>
> Perhaps I'm misreading you here, but this sounds like you expect the
> protection boxes to be able to distinguish when servers see themselves as
> under DOS from when they don't, so that they can tell that the lack of
> 0.5RTT is an indication of an attack response.  Given distribution patterns
> of DOS attacks, I'm struggling to see whether that will commonly be the
> case.
>
> Maybe I wasn't too clear. I don't think that DOS protection boxes are
> trying to take directions from servers. I also don't believe that DOS
> protection boxes have any practical means of distinguishing between 0.5 RTT
> and 1 RTT traffic. That might actually be a problem.
>
>
> You could, of course, always put handshake traffic into low-priority
> queues until you see the 1-RTT packets that validate the server's
> interest.  That would make 1-RTT traffic effectively a path signal of
> validation.
>
> Yes, that's more or less what I was considering. But of course it only
> works if the server refrains from sending 1RTT packets until the handshake
> is confirmed. Otherwise, the protection boxes will have to count the number
> of 1RTT packets coming back from the server, or maybe the amount of data
> coming from the server, and only consider the traffic validated if number
> of packets and amount of data are larger than common values of IW. You
> might end up with 3 classes instead of 2 -- validated if 1RTT > IW,
> validation in progress if 1RTT see but < IW, not validated yet if no 1RTT
> seen.
>
> My concern with that is that using those low priority queues during the
> handshake phase seems likely to result in worse latency and increased risk
> of packet loss (which can be tricky during that phase).  That seems a heavy
> price to pay during non-attack times for better protection when under
> attack.
>
> The problem of the DOS protection box is to drop as much traffic as
> possible while still letting some good in, and also without causing
> performance hits when there are no attacks. There are indeed some thorny
> traffic management issues there. More information helps, and Ben's
> suggestion to look at DOTS is certainly on point.
>
> I am just doing a thought experiment so far. One immediate observation is
> that in the absence of other data, DOS protection designers are likely to
> look at packet types, and certainly reason about 1RTT packets versus long
> header packets. This is definitely an ossification risk.
>
> The other observation is that we have to be careful about the realism of
> thought experiments. If I remember correctly, the payload of the Blaster
> worm was something like:
>
>     On each bot
>
>         Open 256 threads
>
>             In each thread, loop on "GET some large page from the server"
>
> Reasoning about validated traffic would not stop that. But reasoning about
> validated traffic forces the attacker to disclose the "real" IP addresses
> of the attacking bots, which then enables a second line of defense.
>
> -- Christian Huitema
>
>
>
>
> Am I misunderstanding how this is distinguished?
>
> Clue appreciated,
>
> Ted
>
>
>
>> Maybe we should specify that.
>>
>> -- Christian Huitema
>> On 6/19/2020 1:42 PM, Lubashev, Igor wrote:
>>
>> > There is no need for servers to decrypt CIDs in QUIC-LB. Presumably the
>> server has a lookup table for its CIDs.
>>
>>
>>
>> Sending a stateless reset in response to a junk packet would cost more
>> CPU than verifying CID integrity.  But, yes, a server may choose to not
>> send stateless resets to anyone when under attack.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Martin Duke <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
>> *Sent:* Friday, June 19, 2020 2:44 PM
>>
>> >Unfortunately, Retry system protects only server's memory state and some
>> CPU cycles spent on crypto.  (Servers still need to decrypt CID to decide
>> it is invalid, and if the attacker is clever enough to establish one valid
>> connection and use that CID in a flood, the server will also be decrypting
>> packets.)
>>
>>
>>
>> There is no need for servers to decrypt CIDs in QUIC-LB. Presumably the
>> server has a lookup table for its CIDs.
>>
>>
>>
>> It is true that Retry Services (and indeed, the Retry concept as a whole)
>> does nothing to protect network capacity.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 8:08 AM Lubashev, Igor <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>
>> It looks like
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02#section-5
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dquic-2Dload-2Dbalancers-2D02-23section-2D5&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=Djn3bQ5uNJDPM_2skfL3rW1tzcIxyjUZdn_m55KPmlo&m=eTT-BoZ1fMitywKRVSxpU3js0lhO0qkspYTKljvj-ys&s=1x7AN2a51X_zV5xSyK0uCL8vZ5cugD3n4lbFWZDqVQg&e=>
>> is an excellent discussion of Retry mechanics.  It definitely deserves a
>> reference from this manageability draft.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Retry mechanisms described in LB draft are all cooperating boxes, and
>> servers must be aware of them.  Unfortunately, Retry system protects only
>> server's memory state and some CPU cycles spent on crypto.  (Servers still
>> need to decrypt CID to decide it is invalid, and if the attacker is clever
>> enough to establish one valid connection and use that CID in a flood, the
>> server will also be decrypting packets.)  Retry does nothing to protect
>> network resources.
>>
>>
>>
>> The PR I opened (https://github.com/quicwg/ops-drafts/pull/94
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_quicwg_ops-2Ddrafts_pull_94&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=Djn3bQ5uNJDPM_2skfL3rW1tzcIxyjUZdn_m55KPmlo&m=eTT-BoZ1fMitywKRVSxpU3js0lhO0qkspYTKljvj-ys&s=VpvhQ9n79rANIk3O5Sm7PZyToFQEennoPt9iqFpWbq8&e=>)
>> is about uncooperating devices that try to mitigate volumetric network
>> attacks.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Martin Duke <[e-mail]>
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, June 17, 2020 8:16 PM
>>
>> Hi Igor, you might want to check out the "Retry Services" bit of the
>> QUIC-LB draft. This has something to do with the DDoS use case you discuss.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 9:07 AM Lubashev, Igor <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I’m working on a manageability draft PR for this (how to rate limit UDP
>> to reduce disruption to QUIC if you have to rate limit UDP).  ETA end of
>> the week (if I do not get pulled into something again).
>>
>>
>>
>> The relevant observation is that DDoS with UDP that is indistinguishable
>> from QUIC will happen.  UDP is already the most prevalent DDoS vector,
>> since it is easy for a compromised non-admin app to send a flood of huge
>> UDP packets (with TCP you get throttled by the congestion controller).  So
>> there WILL be DDoS protection devices out there to try to mitigate the
>> problem, possibly by observing both directions of the flow and deciding
>> whether a packet belongs to a valid flow or not.
>>
>>
>>
>> Since such middle boxes will be created, the more explicit and normative
>> Invariants are about what one can expect, the less such middle boxes may
>> decide for themselves.  For example (I did not think long about it), if
>> some elements of path validation could land into Invariants (roughly, “no
>> more than X packets/bytes can be sent on a new path w/o a return packet”),
>> a DDoS middle box may use this fact and active connection migration might
>> still have a chance during an attack (NAT rebinding could be linked by DDoS
>> boxes to an old connection via unchanged CID).
>>
>>
>>
>>    - Igor
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 27, 2020 11:34 AM
>>
>> On 5/27/2020 8:28 AM, Kyle Rose wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 10:34 AM Ian Swett <ianswett=
>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> I was agreeing with MT, but I'm happy to see some more MUSTs added if
>> people feel that'd be helpful.
>>
>>
>>
>> Coincidentally, we were just talking about this internally at Akamai
>> yesterday. IMO, an invariants document isn't really helpful if it isn't
>> normative, and for it to be normative it (or a related practices doc for
>> operators) really needs to spell out clear boundaries for operators with
>> MUSTs..
>>
>>
>>
>> The example that came up yesterday was around operators filtering QUIC in
>> the event of a DDoS: one recommendation based on some conversations going
>> back at least to Prague 2019 was to hash packets on 4-tuple and filter
>> those below a hash value chosen for a desired ingress limit instead of
>> doing what most operators do with UDP today, which is to cap UDP throughput
>> and just drop packets randomly or tail drop.
>>
>> Interesting. Did they consider using the CID, or a fraction of it? This
>> looks entirely like the scenario for which we developed stateless retry.
>>
>>
>>
>> This recommendation certainly imposes some constraints on future protocol
>> development that motivate new invariants: for instance, it would preclude
>> sharding a connection across multiple source ports (not that there is
>> necessarily a reason to do this; it's just an example). But more
>> importantly, it goes beyond invariants: it's one among many practices
>> compatible with the current set of invariants, some reasonable and some
>> terrible.
>>
>> This would break the "preferred address" redirection. Preferred address
>> migration may or may not be spelled out in the invariants.
>>
>>
>>
>> Operators are going to do things to QUIC traffic, so it would be good to
>> offer them recommendations that are compatible with broad deployability.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, we do need the invariants for that.
>>
>> -- Christian Huitema
>>
>>