RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption
Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com> Wed, 04 April 2018 23:39 UTC
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From: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
CC: Ian Swett <ianswett=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Subject: RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption
Thread-Topic: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption
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Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 23:39:05 +0000
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Yes I am not opposed to including migration in V1 if its a negotiated option. By "leave the draft as is" I meant it for connections that will not migrate. Parking lot problem/ migration doesn’t apply to: devices connected to just one network, OS policy preventing aggressive use of metered networks, desktops and laptops with just wifi or ethernet, all datacenter servers, and Internet facing servers behind legacy load balancers. It’s not universal. -----Original Message----- From: Mark Nottingham [mailto:mnot@mnot.net] Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 4:27 PM To: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com> Cc: Ian Swett <ianswett=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>; IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>; Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Subject: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption Hi Praveen, On 5 Apr 2018, at 9:22 am, Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com> wrote: > > PNE is one way forward for doing connection migration without linkability. I wouldn’t call it the most pragmatic since it has performance implications. > > Any objections to the following? > 1. Leave the current draft as is for the common case (no migration no multipath). Just noting -- one of the things that came up in Melbourne was that migration for the "parking lot problem" -- i.e., wifi to cellular, or vice versa -- *is* in-scope for QUICv1, in many people's minds. > Make sure we have some provision for greasing the PN to prevent ossification. If PN jumps are needed for this (apart from a random starting PN) we should have a PR modifying current draft. > 2. For connection migration the options are: > a. Explore multiple PN spaces for connection migration (and eventually > multipath), OR b. Make PNE (and hence connection migration) an optional negotiated extension in V1 with the caveat that we will revisit this for V2 when we do multipath. This is required anyways because servers must be able to tell client that they cannot support migration since they are behind a legacy load balancer. -- Mark Nottingham https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mnot.net%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cpravb%40microsoft.com%7C1ac1708c2f024d3ce96608d59a83a010%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636584812483586746&sdata=pMVsnysCkFFkvsmFjaDwuDWKshPBycW8XDYbA70sU3A%3D&reserved=0
- Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Salz, Rich
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Watson Ladd
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Getting to consensus on packet number encryption Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to consen… Lars Eggert
- Re: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Philipp S. Tiesel
- Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on p… Christian Huitema
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Willy Tarreau
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State (was… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes Roland Zink
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Martin Thomson
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes Ian Swett
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Bona fide loss measurement bits alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Christian Huitema
- RE: Privacy holes Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Ian Swett
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Erik Kline
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Boris Pismenny
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Salz, Rich
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Jana Iyengar
- RE: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Gorry Fairhurst
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema