RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption
Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com> Mon, 02 April 2018 16:17 UTC
Return-Path: <pravb@microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49F8B12D77C for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 09:17:40 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1522685860; bh=udWQnZ1ngHLn7EvfCygQ+ZYvaFCG5aiVdW04XAUPzu4=; h=From:CC:Subject:Date:References:In-Reply-To:To:To; b=I2fLngViLFyvK3VFc5XtpCpeHjGyiDGfuMblQwTtJfhSe6yaufIwI33sWLnlI+H1H u5ctCwt1qJXy2We0TiOfTsBVogn3CHcP1B/pZyDBAp19YvkMVWntNidh62oOWjoYeI G9Kep4S3kSPS23zGXbZM2+RyOmOectphkDC8DSL0=
X-Mailbox-Line: From pravb@microsoft.com Mon Apr 2 09:17:40 2018
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C82412D77B for <quic@ietf.org>; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 09:17:40 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1522685860; bh=udWQnZ1ngHLn7EvfCygQ+ZYvaFCG5aiVdW04XAUPzu4=; h=From:CC:Subject:Date:References:In-Reply-To:To:To; b=I2fLngViLFyvK3VFc5XtpCpeHjGyiDGfuMblQwTtJfhSe6yaufIwI33sWLnlI+H1H u5ctCwt1qJXy2We0TiOfTsBVogn3CHcP1B/pZyDBAp19YvkMVWntNidh62oOWjoYeI G9Kep4S3kSPS23zGXbZM2+RyOmOectphkDC8DSL0=
X-Original-To: dmarc-reverse@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dmarc-reverse@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3DEF12D77C for <dmarc-reverse@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 09:17:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.001
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=microsoft.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 69u3aCVT2w2U for <dmarc-reverse@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 09:17:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAM01-BN3-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bn3nam01on071c.outbound.protection.outlook.com [IPv6:2a01:111:f400:fe41::71c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 66DC712D77B for <pravb=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 09:17:37 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=selector1; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version; bh=uisAc3vwqZeRsE0Q7qHG97EI2PMs89KPmuFt0D0PpFg=; b=M+2JUMIWbzaLhnbjGuiSD3wj2DxWpADHoDCN9U40GbuRgsx8klZaHqqR2f87JXrOlqS/z02WXgxcGArSOZjnr5SB788VU2wf5qImrGMgVDw2mWNoDkQpAbCKVSIlwt5ZvnfQsK5TWMnuXWhIWvB4BFDj24eRtwPxLbfgLBuZp98=
Received: from CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com (10.175.115.20) by CY4PR21MB0631.namprd21.prod.outlook.com (10.175.115.21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.653.1; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 16:17:35 +0000
Received: from CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::de:ba33:4748:51da]) by CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::de:ba33:4748:51da%6]) with mapi id 15.20.0675.000; Mon, 2 Apr 2018 16:17:35 +0000
From: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>
CC: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption
Thread-Topic: Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption
Thread-Index: AQHTw2pWXYDTIV9KLUGmQTRvaS20baPfab+AgAAo/YCAAFZ6AIAADAQAgAAvsICAAAzVgIAB2cSAgABzBgCAAAxXAIAADMAAgAANjwCAABZegIADoGkAgAAJ9QCAABTugIAADYsQgAQGnWCAAB1gAIAAAbwAgAJe34CAAKUXAA==
Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2018 16:17:34 +0000
Message-ID: <CY4PR21MB0630A987A60A87396C38773BB6A60@CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com>
References: <7fd34142-2e14-e383-1f65-bc3ca657576c@huitema.net> <F9FCC213-62B9-437C-ADF9-1277E6090317@gmail.com> <CABcZeBM3PfPkqVxPMcWM-Noyk=M2eCFWZw2Eq-XytbHM=0T9Uw@mail.gmail.com> <CAN1APdfjuvd1eBWCYedsbpi1mx9_+Xa6VvZ3aq_Bhhc+HN67ug@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBMtQBwsAF85i=xHmWN3PuGRkJEci+_PjS3LDXi7NgHyYg@mail.gmail.com> <1F436ED13A22A246A59CA374CBC543998B5CCEFD@ORSMSX111.amr.corp.intel.com> <CABcZeBNfPsJtLErBn1=iGKuLjJMo=jEB5OLxDuU7FxjJv=+b=A@mail.gmail.com> <1F436ED13A22A246A59CA374CBC543998B5CDAD4@ORSMSX111.amr.corp.intel.com> <BBB8D1DE-25F8-4F3D-B274-C317848DE872@akamai.com> <CAN1APdd=47b2eXkvMg+Q_+P254xo4vo-Tu-YQu6XoUGMByO_eQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAKcm_gMpz4MpdmrHLtC8MvTf5uO9LjD915jM-i2LfpKY384O2w@mail.gmail.com> <HE1PR0702MB3611A67E764EE1C7D1644FAD84AD0@HE1PR0702MB3611.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com> <d8e35569-e939-4064-9ec4-2cccfba2f341@huitema.net> <CACpbDccqKoF-Y1poHMN2cLOK9GOuvtMTPsF-QEen3b30kUo9bg@mail.gmail.com> <CAKcm_gNffwpraF-H2LQBF33vUhYFx0bi_UXJ3N14k4Xj4NmWUw@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0ckbthsn6V+0ccqZG=PF6BY74rAg-+Wwa7h=4tavOzCs+A@mail.gmail.com> <CY4PR21MB063062DBFA99CA14C6A995F6B6A20@CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> <CY4PR21MB0630E45900B1465B86314330B6A00@CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> <CAN1APddpR_TmV=eiGkbmhmerKjo5KtPnbcqyVKoVNLs3kt1JNA@mail.gmail.com> <DM5PR21MB06364C709443F32193A6E196B6A00@DM5PR21MB0636.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> <27F88FC9-D6EA-485B-8D0C-0A735CAC342C@mnot.net>
In-Reply-To: <27F88FC9-D6EA-485B-8D0C-0A735CAC342C@mnot.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [2001:4898:80e8:7::712]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-microsoft-exchange-diagnostics: 1; CY4PR21MB0631; 7:+6OG0fgw9FtXQPsHZcWymQhnk6VyqlMVtBPzUGXqxbEanDoerQbKmrsWUUOKoYX7+IUVeSSUcJvqduGfeLZ6YipindEzTHt53TLGx7l7TY2MthzHRvH+nqTbRBhAdyVmWz2JgOxJjGObfLTb+QC63BUMmCUw31Y5tiKwjYDMIrtQ8c3iiClwGQMDR2s0N0Y/LQyelvqIWwtymjTtfCkjucuf+upqRXywJ1Uo8ERjIvVSIPIEz2BMguCMDwR78w9C; 20:1mjKr0Z6Y/+POOXehA5pLM9s2iw+FK8336bpoGZ4O/J/yMskToLDkXREaWwP+6xSQQObaF9mKNYT/JF6M33zK0eWYORxQxC1eArgI+KmUnwxZkSBq3heQC2BYdSMunX3ysXMBcyM4RgRoS0bh6d97b025TbTVMDl8y/xpzuzM8Y=
x-ms-exchange-antispam-srfa-diagnostics: SOS;
x-ms-office365-filtering-ht: Tenant
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 80e89cd7-b7bd-420d-40b7-08d598b53eae
x-microsoft-antispam: UriScan:; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(7020095)(4652020)(48565401081)(5600026)(4604075)(3008032)(4534165)(4627221)(201703031133081)(201702281549075)(2017052603328)(7193020); SRVR:CY4PR21MB0631;
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: CY4PR21MB0631:
authentication-results: spf=none (sender IP is ) smtp.mailfrom=pravb@microsoft.com;
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <CY4PR21MB0631CC73C0CBC481B7E784DCB6A60@CY4PR21MB0631.namprd21.prod.outlook.com>
x-exchange-antispam-report-test: UriScan:(189930954265078)(219752817060721);
x-exchange-antispam-report-cfa-test: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(8211001083)(61425038)(6040522)(2401047)(5005006)(8121501046)(10201501046)(93006095)(93001095)(3002001)(3231221)(944501327)(52105095)(6055026)(61426038)(61427038)(6041310)(201703131423095)(201702281528075)(20161123555045)(201703061421075)(201703061406153)(20161123558120)(20161123564045)(20161123562045)(20161123560045)(6072148)(201708071742011); SRVR:CY4PR21MB0631; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:; SRVR:CY4PR21MB0631;
x-forefront-prvs: 0630013541
x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10019020)(346002)(396003)(39380400002)(39860400002)(366004)(376002)(13464003)(199004)(189003)(76176011)(478600001)(68736007)(316002)(2900100001)(93886005)(105586002)(7696005)(33656002)(97736004)(229853002)(11346002)(8936002)(74316002)(7736002)(8990500004)(3660700001)(305945005)(99286004)(5250100002)(22452003)(4326008)(2906002)(6246003)(10090500001)(81156014)(81166006)(486005)(476003)(3280700002)(486005)(186003)(110136005)(53546011)(102836004)(6506007)(25786009)(966005)(46003)(5660300001)(14454004)(446003)(86362001)(6436002)(53936002)(9686003)(86612001)(6306002)(10290500003)(8676002)(55016002)(6116002)(106356001); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; SCL:1; SRVR:CY4PR21MB0631; H:CY4PR21MB0630.namprd21.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; LANG:en; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:1; MX:1;
received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: microsoft.com does not designate permitted sender hosts)
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: W3YrLomXNvf6yA16b5RLBENmnZPTDP8TncQUvMY59y+AVl4WjRzlB1fueZYlNTuWW8Ij6y8/H7pAZjJwn4p6YPIyEZsMTpl9yrdvfvBM1JmDCdnu/SiBEQPSgEDSsgNeilvYHDjKzi38IsnkyBuJZNJFmIUsVf259kGvJXdvlDkPoVLABaGJ+B1wQyWiUrZOr16BSY9TG11EixmvVpWzzXxh8A3ur1hYpE1VSdFE/488KO5Jg4ksTO+5z2S0zq3bP/IJu+a8VhbYmMh7MBMlWUynLdTlNORNogA/s9AdJ1gLEJWunw+c5YQbNiz7L/Vtg0v/kyncXzbojVYNddOV4Fg/VZXLaweRtrpuIy3+G5oBWQbmz9xSETba8RjP4DGGEY2QYlYn3PBgbDyqKiTXE9kR6qlG5ezi0/JFnLvIBJ0=
spamdiagnosticoutput: 1:99
spamdiagnosticmetadata: NSPM
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: microsoft.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 80e89cd7-b7bd-420d-40b7-08d598b53eae
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 02 Apr 2018 16:17:34.9041 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: CY4PR21MB0631
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
To: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic/scaCUeEK82teBDgqLox5zAGullc>
X-BeenThere: quic@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Main mailing list of the IETF QUIC working group <quic.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2018 16:17:40 -0000
Since PN is the very last field before encrypted payload, it should be ok to exclude the field from invariants. Several benefits ensue - well behaved middleboxes don't even look at an end-to-end field, leaves room for future crypto that doesn't need a cleartext nonce, datacenter QUIC could subsume PN into the encrypted portion, and cleartext QUIC in a controlled environment can just skip the encryption step. However if we add any new fields to invariants some future version onwards, would they need to be placed before PN? Since implementations will do version specific parsing this shouldn't be a big problem. -----Original Message----- From: QUIC [mailto:quic-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mark Nottingham Sent: Sunday, April 1, 2018 11:15 PM To: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org> Subject: Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption Hi Praveen, On 1 Apr 2018, at 4:17 am, Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > PN size and location needs to be part of invariants. How the field is transformed and encoded in the clear is an end-to-end function and can change between versions. Invariants is in WGLC now, but does not include packet numbers. If you believe it needs to be in there, please raise an issue and we can discuss it (in a separate thread). Cheers, -- Mark Nottingham https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mnot.net%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cpravb%40microsoft.com%7Ce135b2a8beff46bdf44208d598611381%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636582465072048656&sdata=OigvpPbNPqhLMJDYJ4xyphpFuyanfQzrY9eOwLwX2xU%3D&reserved=0
- Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Salz, Rich
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Watson Ladd
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Getting to consensus on packet number encryption Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to consen… Lars Eggert
- Re: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Philipp S. Tiesel
- Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on p… Christian Huitema
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Willy Tarreau
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State (was… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes Roland Zink
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Martin Thomson
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes Ian Swett
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Bona fide loss measurement bits alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Christian Huitema
- RE: Privacy holes Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Ian Swett
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Erik Kline
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Boris Pismenny
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Salz, Rich
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Jana Iyengar
- RE: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Gorry Fairhurst
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema