Re: UDP source ports for HTTP/3 and QUIC

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Fri, 16 July 2021 00:27 UTC

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Subject: Re: UDP source ports for HTTP/3 and QUIC
From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
In-Reply-To: <CAKC-DJjHObadQo1O9XngTkxr3PswQ5YUMfLs9NUaDdJHye8Ggw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2021 10:27:20 +1000
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
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Adding source ports to Fetch to complement their list of "bad" destination ports is interesting, but probably not sufficient -- NAT and CGNAT vendors tend not to read that document.

If we believe both that this should be written down and that more reflection-capable applications are going to emerge, we should probably put this information in a registry.

It strikes me that it could be done by adding a column to the port registry <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/>. In other words, TSVWG. Thoughts?

Cheers,


> On 16 Jul 2021, at 9:25 am, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 8:21 PM Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:
> [ bringing this up on both lists because it's not yet clear what the right scope is ]
> 
> It's not uncommon for servers to block certain UDP source ports to avoid being overwhelmed by certain reflection attacks. In particular:
> 
> * 53 - DNS
> * 123 - NTP
> * 1900 - SSDP
> * 5353 - mDNS
> * 11211 - memcached
> 
> ... among other candidates.
> 
> See, eg., <https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/>. This isn't done to avoid protocol vulnerabilities as such -- it's to avoid volumetric attacks (usually DDoS). 
> 
> 
> 
> Closely related, the Fetch spec's "bad port" list is fairly TCP-specific and could likely
> use additions for some of these.  I opened https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/issues/1268
> to track that.
> 
>     Erik
> 
> 

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/