Connection coalescing in HTTP/QUIC

Frederik Deweerdt <fdeweerdt@fastly.com> Wed, 31 October 2018 22:48 UTC

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From: Frederik Deweerdt <fdeweerdt@fastly.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:48:24 -0700
Message-ID: <CAM8YLW=xxHQpLdrOmy_i5gOFRyax8UC7P9cXRSNE=xQ+gHUtDA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Connection coalescing in HTTP/QUIC
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Hello,

In draft-ietf-quic-http-16 "2.4. Connection Reuse" states:

>  Clients MUST NOT assume that an HTTP/QUIC endpoint is authoritative for other origins without an explicit signal.


The explicit signal bit (is it referring to an origin frame?) reads
more restrictive than connection coalescing for HTTP/2. Does that mean
that clients wouldn't
be coalescing connections based on what the certificate is
authoritative for and the DNS resolution results?


Thanks,

Frederik