Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trust models
Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Fri, 11 August 2023 13:00 UTC
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From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2023 08:59:53 -0400
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To: Jan-Frederik Rieckers <rieckers@dfn.de>
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Subject: Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trust models
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On Aug 11, 2023, at 6:03 AM, Jan-Frederik Rieckers <rieckers@dfn.de> wrote: > We have had discussion about the Requirement for TLS/DTLS on the client side an have reached a consensus, as far as I read the list, that the server should support both, but the clients can choose to implement only one. > Would it be a good idea to continue this with the mutual authentication as well? > > The idea would be: RADIUS/(D)TLS servers MUST implement certificates with PKIX trust model and TLS-PSK, RADIUS/(D)TLS clients MUST implement at least one of those two. I think that's reasonable. > This way we still ensure complete compatibility, but RADIUS clients that currently only support RADIUS/UDP with shared secrets can upgrade to RADIUS/(D)TLS easily without the need to implement a whole PKIX certificate validation stack. > > However, this is a significant change in the spec, since RFC 6614 did not mandate TLS-PSK. > > Implementation status, as far as I know: > > * FreeRADIUS implements TLS-PSK for RadSec > * Radsecproxy just became capable in the current master, will probably be released in the 1.11 version. > > I have not checked RADIATOR and I'm not sure if there are more RADIUS/TLS implementations out there. It's hard to say. Publicly available documents don't list TLS-PSK for many implementations, so my guess is "no". Alan DeKok.
- [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trust mo… Jan-Frederik Rieckers
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Alan DeKok
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Margaret Cullen
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… josh.howlett
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Margaret Cullen
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Alan DeKok
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Alan DeKok
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Alexander Clouter
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Margaret Cullen
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Jan-Frederik Rieckers
- Re: [radext] TLS-PSK and RADIUS/(D)TLS - MTI trus… Stefan Paetow