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[radext] Re: Lack of Channel Bindings in RADIUS/(D)TLS

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 30 July 2024 22:00 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
to: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>, radext@ietf.org
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Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 18:00:45 -0400
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Subject: [radext] Re: Lack of Channel Bindings in RADIUS/(D)TLS
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Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
    >> One additional reason for mandating TLS 1.3 support is that the major
    >> RADIUS servers already support it.

    > For server to server (proxy) situations, that seems quite reasonable to
    > mandate 1.3.

Or to put it another way, if eduroam declared TLS 1.3 or die, I think that
would be okay.

    > Are the access devices up to this?
    > To me, even TLS 1.1 seems better than RADIUS/(UDP)-MD5.
    > (What are we calling the legacy insecure method?)

And if we have access devices that will never be upgraded to any version of
TLS, putting a local radius proxy in front of them that can do TLS seems fine
as well.

The (industry-wide) upgrade to libraries that support TLS 1.3 hasn't been that easy.
Many things have been inadvertedly broken.
DTLS 1.3 is even harder.  It's not a technical problem exactly.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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