[radext] FW: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-00.txt

Xueli <xueli@huawei.com> Thu, 28 March 2013 02:12 UTC

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From: Xueli <xueli@huawei.com>
To: "radext@ietf.org" <radext@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-00.txt
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Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 02:12:41 +0000
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Subject: [radext] FW: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-00.txt
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Hi all

There is a draft to resolve the some issue raised in WLAN network.

In the authentication architecture, only STA and AS can manufacture PMK, 
moreover, AS can only distribute PMK to Authenticator.However, if the authenticator function is not collocated
with the encryption/decryption function, it is difficult to achieve traffic encryption/decryption in WLAN network.

The purpose of this document is to analyze the requirement and issue for key management that have arisen so far 
during STA authentication process in WLAN network. Meanwhile, the control messages for key management are defined.

Your comments are appreciated.

BR
Li
>-----Original Message-----
>From: internet-drafts@ietf.org [mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org]
>Sent: Monday, February 18, 2013 7:31 PM
>To: Xueli
>Subject: New Version Notification for draft-xue-radext-key-management-00.txt
>
>
>A new version of I-D, draft-xue-radext-key-management-00.txt
>has been successfully submitted by Li Xue and posted to the
>IETF repository.
>
>Filename:	 draft-xue-radext-key-management
>Revision:	 00
>Title:		 RADIUS Extensions for Key Management in WLAN network
>Creation date:	 2013-02-18
>Group:		 Individual Submission
>Number of pages: 17
>URL:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-xue-radext-key-management-00.txt
>Status:
>http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xue-radext-key-management
>Htmlized:
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-xue-radext-key-management-00
>
>
>Abstract:
>   In order to guarantee the security and integration of the subscriber
>   in WLAN network, Pairwise Master Key (PMK) will be generated as an
>   access authorization token during the mutual authentication procedure
>   between station (STA) and authenticator server (AS).  Then, the PMK
>   and 4-way handshake are used between STA and Authenticator to derive,
>   bind and verify the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), which is a
>   collection of operational keys for security.  Also,Group Transient
>   Key (GTK) can be derived, and is used to secure multicast/broadcast
>   traffic.  In the authentication architecture, only STA and AS can
>   manufacture PMK, moreover, AS can only distribute PMK to
>   Authenticator.However, if the authenticator function is not
>   collocated with the encryption/decryption function, it is difficult
>   to achieve traffic encryption/decryption in WLAN network.The purpose
>   of this document is to analyze the requirement and issue for key
>   management that have arisen so far during STA authentication process
>   in WLAN network.  Meanwhile, the control messages for key
>management
>   are defined.
>
>
>
>
>The IETF Secretariat