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[radext] Re: Selfie Attack on TLS-PSK

Margaret Cullen <mrcullen42@gmail.com> Thu, 25 July 2024 07:38 UTC

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From: Margaret Cullen <mrcullen42@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 00:37:44 -0700
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To: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
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Subject: [radext] Re: Selfie Attack on TLS-PSK
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Thanks, Hannes!  Is it your understanding that if we make the changes you suggested, that RADIUS systems that follow our advice would not be subject to the Selfie attack?

Margaret

On Jul 24, 2024, at 8:42 PM, Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net wrote:



Hi Margaret,

 

I pointed this out in my review here:

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/radext/Rnh9mBSC_n87-c6yUrCpakVu_B0/" rel="nofollow">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/radext/Rnh9mBSC_n87-c6yUrCpakVu_B0/

 

Ciao

Hannes

 

 

From: Margaret Cullen <mrcullen42@gmail.com>
Sent: Mittwoch, 24. Juli 2024 13:37
To: radext@ietf.org
Subject: [radext] Selfie Attack on TLS-PSK

 

On a separate but related note…. 

 

I came across this attack while reading about TLS mutual authentication:

 

<image001.png>

https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/347.pdf" rel="nofollow">347

https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/347.pdf" rel="nofollow">PDF Document · 1.2 MB

 

 

Is this something we should consider before we recommend the use of TLS-PSK with TLS 1.3? Or has this issues already been addressed?

 

Thanks,

Margaret

 

 

 

 

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