Re: [radext] #148: Review of dynamic-discovery by Jim Schaad

Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com> Wed, 27 February 2013 15:24 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
To: Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>
References: <065.a122826c6d7c009295065142646863ee@trac.tools.ietf.org> <512E23F3.3000307@restena.lu>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:24:40 -0500
In-Reply-To: <512E23F3.3000307@restena.lu> (Stefan Winter's message of "Wed, 27 Feb 2013 16:19:15 +0100")
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Subject: Re: [radext] #148: Review of dynamic-discovery by Jim Schaad
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>>>>> "Stefan" == Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu> writes:


    Stefan> That is a decision for a deployer of the algorithm to make
    Stefan> though: the security considerations say that it's only safe
    Stefan> with DNSSEC - which is true; every deployer is free to draw
    Stefan> his own consequences from that.

I disagree.  In general, we require people to have a MTI solution that
provides what we believe is generally adequate security.  While it's
fine for eduroam to say that one IDP impersonating another is OK for
eduroam, I think that's not good enough as a MTI mechanism because there
are a lot of environments where that distinction would be important.

So, I do think we need to have rules about what implementations MUST be
able to support in terms of cert validation and naming configuration.

--Sam