[Rats] Claims for to device trust (was Re: RATS use cases review)

Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com> Sat, 12 October 2019 22:59 UTC

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From: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
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To: Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay <jmfmckay@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Rats] Claims for to device trust (was Re: RATS use cases review)
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On Oct 11, 2019, at 7:49 AM, Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay <jmfmckay@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> As a potential "end user" of attestation standards, I want RATS to be able to answer the question of whether or not I can trust a device on my network. And, the answer to that question will depend a lot on what kind of claims I can get and verify from the device. But I can see that being outside the scope of the style use case document we are writing right now. 

Yes, outside of the use case document, but not outside the EAT draft <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-01>. The claims in it now that I think relate to device trust are:
OEM — who made the device, the chip, sub modules?
Boot and debug state — is it in a operationally secure mode? (Also see new PR  <https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/eat/pull/36>for this one)

I’m tracking proposed new claims as issues in GitHub labeled “new claim” <https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/eat/issues?q=is:open+is:issue+label:%22new+claim%22>. From the issues list these seem related:
Software measurement and/or integrity
Software inventory, particularly version compared to a known-good-values list of the latest security patched SW

What else?

LL