Re: [Rats] Use case -> architecture document

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 16 October 2019 14:36 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 10:35:21 -0400
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Use case -> architecture document
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On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 10:31 AM Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
wrote:

>
> Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>     >> Schönwälder, Jürgen wrote:
>     >> > Henk's architecture discusses 'Attestation Principles' that are
> not
>     >> in
>     >> > Dave's proposal. I guess the WG needs to decide whether to include
>     >> them
>     >> > or not. Are these important for understanding or guiding the RATS
>     >> work?
>     >>
>     >> I think that, to the extent that the architecture document includes
>     >> requirements on the technical document must answer, that these
> principles
>     >> need to be made explicit.   They should be numbered as well so that
> we know
>     >> which principle to compromise to maintain another one.
>
>     > In a sense, Dave's document covers this idea as it does discuss the
> ability
>     > for 2 functions to be combined.  I don't think adding a term is
> needed to
>     > state that though and adding a specific term for that leads to
>     > confusion.
>
> I need the architecture document to introduce terms like "freshness" and
> "provenance"
> and explain how they apply in an attestation context.  I need to know, if I
> have to compromise one or the other to satisfy a particular use case, which
> one is more important.
>

Agreed, this is important.  Attestations also provide origin
authentication, which is the basis for provenance.  Provenance just makes
that origin authentication (possibly for nested components) to be
possible.  IMO, it's a well understood term and should be easy to add, but
I'd like to see it in context of origin authentication that helps to
provide provenance.  It's how I talked about it yesterday.


>
> {I don't claim the other document does a great job at defining those
> terms, btw}
>
Hopefully, my explanation helps toward a definition in terms used in the
IETF already.

Best regards,
Kathleen


>
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>
>
>
>

-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen