Re: [Rats] Use cases in draft-ietf-rats-architecture-04

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 09 June 2020 16:33 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
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Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2020 12:33:46 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Use cases in draft-ietf-rats-architecture-04
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Thank you for your comments.

I believe that documents go from "too little" text, to a point where there is
now "too much" (oversell) text, and the feedback I'm hearing from you, is that we are
now on the too much side.

Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> wrote:
    > Section 3.6 "Hardware Watchdog" is something I have not heard
    > about. The concept of a watchdog in embedded systems is well-known but
    > it has a different meaning, see
    > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watchdog_timer Is there a reference to an
    > article or something that indeed confirms that "malware that holds a
    > device hostage and does not allow it to reboot to prevent updates to be
    > applied". Reading through the text makes me feel that you made this
    > up. (FWIW we had a researcher proposing such a remote watchdog but it
    > didn't require attestation. It was never implemented and you can
    > immediately see that there are practical challenges...)

This situation comes from the desktop situation.

The machine has upgraded, and as soon as it would reboot, it would be safe,
but the malware keeps clicking "Cancel" on the "reboot now" dialog.
Applications reasonably can and should say, "No, do not reboot now",
but there needs to be a limit, and the use of a watchdog in a
hardware/firmware TPM module can do that.

It is *exactly* as in the embedded case (keep holding the switch down, or I
blow up), but the "reset watchdog" mechanism is no longer just poking some
hardware register, but rather, supplying some Attestation Result to it as to
health of system.

How can we rewrite this to make this clearer for you?

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-