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Re: [Rats] Composite Evidence

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fri, 24 January 2020 20:15 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Smith, Ned" <ned.smith@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Composite Evidence
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Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com> wrote:
    > Smith, Ned <ned.smith@intel.com> wrote:
    mcr> [%] I think you are saying that rather than documenting that we
    mcr> forward a union of evidence and attestation results, that we
    mcr> document that will create a kind of evidence, which includes attestation results?

    Ned> Maybe. It really is a case of multiplexing several conversations
    Ned> over the same conveyance mechanism, but otherwise conversations
    Ned> could be de-multiplexed (without creating unnecessary
    Ned> cross-dependencies). For example in both Passport and BK-Check
    Ned> topology models, a message is simply relayed. The endpoints are
    Ned> still the way they're defined in the Roles Arch diagram.

    mcr> yes, I agree, we could send a list of evidence and a list of attestion
    mcr> results from components.  I don't really know what the list of potential
    mcr> *verification* protocols is.

    Nms> I don't know what a verification protocol is. I would describe the
    Nms> interaction between a Verifier and Relying Party as Attestation
    Nms> Results exchange over a conveyance protocol. This implies there is a
    Nms> protocol binding specification needed for each protocol that is used
    Nms> for conveyance.

I don't know what to call the Attester->Verifier connection.
Yes, it's a conveyance protocol.

    mcr> I don't think this communication can ever be via certificate, while the final
    mcr> attestation results could be placed inside a certificate.

    nms> Both a certificate and token are examples of signed documents that
    nms> could include both Evidence or Attestation Results

A certificate (manufacturer signed IDevID...) could convey fresh evidence?
I find that hard to believe.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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