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Re: [Rats] device attestation and ACME

Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> Wed, 20 July 2022 23:07 UTC

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Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 19:07:32 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, rats@ietf.org, acme@ietf.org
Message-ID: <B950BEDF-DF18-4AF0-95A1-0EF3C0A9EA6A@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] device attestation and ACME
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Subject: Re: [Rats] device attestation and ACME
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Distributing trust anchors to verify device attestations is one of the aims of https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wallace-rats-concise-ta-stores-00. Note, there's also a LAMPS draft that borrows the WebAuthn format approach from this ACME device attestation draft but for use in extensions suitable for CMP, EST, SCEP, etc.

On 7/20/22, 6:41 PM, "RATS on behalf of Michael Richardson" <rats-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:


    I read acme-device-attest, and I guess the key part is a new device-attest-01
    method.

    https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-00.html#name-device-attestation-challeng

    tries to explain the format, and how the challenge is signed by the device.
    What I do not understand is any of the trust relationships between the ACME
    server and the manufacturer/provisionor of the Android Key Attestation/Chrome
    OS Verified Access/Trusted Platform Module.

    Why does the Enterprise trust the attestation key?

    -- 
    Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
     -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-



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